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YOUR MONEY OR YOUR SPEECH: THE 
CHILDREN’S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT AND 
THE CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULT ON THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES 
STEVEN D. HINCKLEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal government is painfully conflicted about the Internet. 
Faced with compelling evidence of a growing “digital divide” in our 
society that threatens to leave those without the personal means to obtain 
computer and Internet access unprepared to compete in the emerging 
global information age,1 Congress enacted a sweeping change to the 
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 1. In a 1995 study of Americans’ computer ownership and usage, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce found a direct correlation between household income and ethnicity on the one hand, and 
the rate of household computer ownership and Internet access on the other. The study concluded that 
the nation’s poorest families, those with household incomes of less than $10,000 per year, particularly 
those living in rural locations, were as much as ten times less likely to have either a computer in their 
homes or to have any personal means to connect to the Internet than families living in the same regions 
with household incomes of more than $50,000 per year. The study also found that Blacks and 
Hispanics, regardless of income, were three to four times less likely to own a computer or to have 
home access to the Internet than Caucasians. See United States Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. 
& Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: A Survey of the “Have Nots” in Rural and Urban America 
(1995), Tables 2 & 5, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fallingthru.html. The Department 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1025 Hinckley book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:31 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1026 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1025 
 
 
 
 
nation’s telecommunications policy in 1996 intended to begin closing that 
gap. With its creation of the Universal Service Fund for schools and 
libraries2—the so-called “E-Rate fund”—Congress moved toward making 
a national commitment to affordable and ubiquitous Internet access as it 
had done over sixty years earlier when, in support of universal telephone 
service, Congress mandated discounted service for those unable to afford 
it and devised a funding source from which telephone companies could be 
reimbursed for the discounts provided.3 Since the E-rate program’s 
inception, over $10 billion has been distributed to support requests for 
telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal network 
connections in schools and libraries, with the emphasis on institutions in 
the nation’s most economically disadvantaged communities.4 Studies of 
                                                                                                                         
 
of Commerce tracked changes in the digital divide in four subsequent reports released between 1998 
and 2002. While these reports show that the per capita rate of computer ownership and Internet access 
among the nation’s poor and minorities has gradually improved since 1995, the percentage gap 
between the information “haves” and “have-nots” has actually widened during those years. See United 
States Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net II: New Data 
on the Digital Divide (1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ ntiahome/net2/falling.html; United 
States Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Defining the 
Digital Divide (1999), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/fttn.pdf; United States 
Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital 
Inclusion (2000), available at http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf; United State Dep’t of 
Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding 
Their Use of the Internet (2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/ 
anationonline2.pdf. But see Stephen Labaton, New F.C.C. Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at C1 (reporting on the inaugural press conference of President Bush’s F.C.C. 
Chairman Michael K. Powell in which he disputed use of the phrase “digital divide,” calling it instead 
a “Mercedes divide” because it is being perpetuated by people who would like to have something that 
they cannot afford). 
 2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending, inter 
alia, 47 U.S.C. § 254). 
 3. The federal government introduced its Universal Service Program (Universal Service) with 
the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title I, § I, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (2002)). Originally enacted to ensure affordable phone service to all Americans, it is a 
natural extension of the original legislation’s goal of universal access to telecommunications media 
that the Communication Act of 1934 is now being invoked to provide the same assurance of access to 
the Internet for all. Universal Service has garnered a great deal of criticism from those who would 
reform or eliminate the program. See generally James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty 
of Policy, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (2000) (calling for reforms in the current Universal Service model 
that the author suggests is now outdated and incapable of functioning in the current 
telecommunications market); Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge 
and Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2000) (same); Gregory L. Rosston & 
Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC’s of Universal Service: Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and Competition, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 1585 (1999) (same). 
 4. Universal Service Administrative Company, 2000 Annual Report 4, available at 
http://www.universalservice.org/reports/2000/. Funds collected and distributed to support universal 
service requests are administered by The Universal Service Administrative Company, an independent, 
not-for-profit organization created in 1997 under regulations promulgated by the Federal 
Communication Commission. As of August 7, 2002, $724,133,884 had been committed for that year’s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/1
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the program’s impact confirm that, by making Internet access possible at 
schools and libraries, particularly in high-poverty and high-minority 
districts, E-rate universal service discounts are meeting congressional 
objectives by helping close the gap between those who can afford private 
online access and those who cannot.5 Having set in motion a program that 
is succeeding in bringing equality of Internet access to all Americans, 
many in Congress seem now to regret what they have unleashed. As online 
activity has increased, a perception has arisen in Congress that the Internet 
is a dangerous place, full of objectionable content that the government 
must control at all costs, ostensibly because uncontrolled Internet access, 
particularly to sexual material, is “harmful” to children.6 Despite the near 
total absence of any credible research drawing an absolute correlation 
between exposure of children to controversial media images and resulting 
lasting harm,7 the image of the Internet as a “red light district” actively 
corrupting minors has been carefully nurtured by those who would censor 
it.8 
                                                                                                                         
 
E-rate discounts, 5.31% of which ($35,432,764) was in response to requests from libraries and library 
consortia. The vast majority of the 2002 commitments (81% or $584,798,041) were targeted for school 
districts. See Universal Service Administrative Company, Funding Commitments: Cumulative 
National Data—Funding Year 2002, at http://www.sl.universalservice.org/funding/y5/national.asp 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 5. See Michael J. Puma et al., E-Rate and the Digital Divide: A Preliminary Analysis From the 
Integrated Studies of Educational Technology 98-100, THE URBAN INSTITUTE AND U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY, PLANNING AND EDUCATION SERVICE, 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION DIVISION, available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/ 
PES/erate_fr.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 6. A search of the Congressional Record since 1996 yields numerous comments by House and 
Senate members tempering their enthusiasm for the Internet as an information source with their 
concern that the Internet is a dangerous place for children. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S1646 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1996) (statement by Sen. James Exon) (“[T]here are, indeed, real dangers on the Internet, 
especially for children and especially with the interactive computer services that are available . . . .”); 
144 CONG. REC. H9909 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee) (“Although 
the Web can be a fantastic vehicle for enriching our lives, we must also keep unwanted sexual imagery 
and pornography from invading our children’s lives.”); 146 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. June 22, 
2000) (statement by Sen. John McCain) (“[S]tatistics . . . represent both the tremendous promise and 
the exponential danger that wiring America's children to the Internet poses.”); 146 CONG. REC. H9535 
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 2000) (statement by Rep. Virgil Goode) (“As more and more Americans are 
utilizing the Internet and many children in this country have access to the Internet, it is important that 
we raise awareness to the dangers that the Internet can pose, especially to children.”). 
 7. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children 
from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 504 (2000) (“Although it is nearly impossible to 
find an iota of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children, speech concerned with 
sexuality is the content most commonly subject to regulation on their behalf . . . .”). See also 
MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: “INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE 
INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 243-53 (2001) (summarizing contemporary social science research questioning 
any lasting harm to children exposed to sexual or violent media images). 
 8. This lurid description of the Internet has often been repeated in remarks by members of 
Congress since the mid-1990s. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H9907 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As a result, virtually every pro-Internet initiative enacted by Congress 
since the mid-1990s has been checked by even more aggressive legislative 
efforts to reduce the perceived dangers of the online world. Initially, those 
efforts took the form of direct statutory proscriptions, not just of Internet 
content that legislative sponsors described as “obscene,” but also of 
content that is merely “indecent” or “patently offensive.” Informed quickly 
and forcefully by the courts that direct regulation of Internet speech could 
not withstand constitutional scrutiny,9 Congress creatively turned to 
indirect methods to make the Internet “safe for children.”  
The vehicle they chose was the Children’s Internet Protection Act10 
(CIPA), a statute that places conditions on distribution of the very federal 
funds earmarked under the E-rate program and similar programs to make 
the Internet accessible in schools and libraries. To receive those funds, 
institutions must agree to place, on all their computers capable of 
accessing the Internet, software filters that block access to visual 
depictions that are obscene, are child pornography, or are harmful to 
minors (when accessed by a minor).11 Proponents of the law see the 
contingency placed on funds offered to schools and libraries as a routine 
use of the congressional spending power; they maintain that the legislation 
is a means rationally related to the government’s legitimate purpose of 
ensuring that funds used to connect children to the Internet cannot be used 
to expose minors to harmful online materials.12 
As compelling and intuitively persuasive as that may sound, CIPA is, 
in fact, one of the most sweeping restrictions on constitutionally protected 
                                                                                                                         
 
Rep. Michael G. Oxley) (“Children cannot safely learn in a virtual red light district.”); 143 CONG. 
REC. S12148 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daniel Coats) (“Internet Access Providers are 
pulling in the big bucks, providing access to the red light district.”); 142 CONG. REC. 2030 (1996) 
(statement of Sen. Daniel Coats) (“[F]oul material on the internet . . . takes the worst excesses of [a] 
red-light district and places it directly into a child’s bedroom, on the computer their parents bought 
them to help them with their homework.”); 141 CONG. REC. 3203 (1995) (statement of Sen. James 
Exon) (“[T]he information superhighway should not become a red light district.”).  
 9. For discussion of Congress’s direct restrictions on availability of “indecent” or “offensive” 
material on the Internet, and their failure to pass constitutional scrutiny, see infra Part II.A regarding 
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and Part II.B regarding the Child Online Protection Act. 
 10. Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (Supp. 2001); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 9134 (Supp. 2001). 
 11. See infra Part III.B for statutory requirements of CIPA. 
 12. 146 CONG. REC. S5646 (daily ed. June 22, 2000) (statement by Sen. John McCain) (“I am 
not advocating censorship. The fact is that when Federal dollars are used to wire schools and libraries 
in America, then it seems to me the schools and libraries have an obligation to provide Internet filters 
and use them according to community standards . . . .”); 144 CONG. REC. S519 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1998) 
(statement by Sen. McCain) (“Once a school or library certifies that it will use a filtering system, they 
will be eligible to receive universal service fund subsidies for Internet access. If schools and libraries 
do not so certify, they will not be eligible to receive universal service fund–subsidized discounts.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/1
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speech ever invoked by the United States government disingenuously 
presented as an uncontroversial funding decision. By mandating the use of 
technology that cannot effectively eliminate obscenity and child 
pornography without compromising a great deal of protected speech,13 and 
by attempting to achieve indirectly content restrictions that the courts have 
held Congress cannot accomplish through direct statutory proscriptions,14 
CIPA offends the First Amendment as surely as any prior failed attempt 
by the legislature to restrict Internet speech. Despite the great latitude 
granted to Congress under the spending power to make federal fund 
allocation decisions,15 that power is significantly limited when it is used to 
control the content of speech. This is particularly true in environments 
such as public libraries, where adults have a right to engage in speech that 
is constitutionally protected for them, but that in the hands of minors 
would have no such protections.16 
It is in the public library context that CIPA has faced its initial First 
Amendment challenge. A month before the new law’s April 2001 
implementation date, a group of public libraries and their patrons, library 
associations, and Internet publishers filed suit,17 pursuant to CIPA’s 
provisions for expedited judicial review,18 in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.19 The plaintiffs alleged that 
the conditions placed on federal funding under CIPA are facially 
unconstitutional because they compel public libraries to violate the First 
Amendment rights of their patrons, and because CIPA unconstitutionally 
 
 
 13. See infra notes 420-33 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the ineffectiveness 
of filters. 
 14. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 15. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of judicial deference to congressional spending power. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 43-51 for a discussion of variable obscenity standards for 
adults and minors. 
 17. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 414-16 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(listing the plaintiffs in each category). Although schools receive funds from two of the federal 
funding sources made conditional by CIPA, the current constitutional challenge of the statute covers 
only its impact on public libraries. As a result, this Article, like the current case, does not consider 
CIPA’s constitutionality as applied to schools. Filtering Internet content in schools raises its own 
unique and troublesome constitutional difficulties. For a discussion of some of these issues, see 
generally Kelley Baker, Public Schools and the Internet, 79 NEB. L. REV. 929 (2000), and Kathleen 
Conn, Protecting Children From Internet Harm (Again): Will the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
Survive Judicial Scrutiny? 153 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 469 (2001) (each analyzing the constitutionality 
of the Children’s Internet Protection Act with emphasis placed on CIPA’s application in public 
schools). 
 18. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appendix D § 1741, 114 
Stat. 2763A—351-52 (2000). The statute calls for any constitutional challenge to be heard “by a 
district court of three judges.” Id. § 1741(a). 
 19. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conditions receipt of federal funds on the relinquishment of libraries’ own 
First Amendment rights.20 On May 31, 2002, a three-judge panel held, in 
American Library Association v. United States,21 that CIPA is facially 
invalid because no public library complying with the statute’s Internet 
filtering requirement could do so without blocking a substantial amount of 
speech that its patrons have a First Amendment right to receive.22 The 
district court issued an order permanently enjoining the federal 
government from withholding funds from public libraries for failure to 
comply with CIPA conditions,23 but this order is surely not the final 
chapter concerning the constitutionality of the law. Perhaps anticipating 
rough sledding at the district court level and not wishing to waste time 
with an intermediate appeal, Congress conveniently built into CIPA a 
provision for direct review by the Supreme Court of any district court 
finding that the statute is unconstitutional.24 Revealingly, Congress made 
any findings adverse to its position reviewable “as a matter of right,” 
leaving the Supreme Court little option but to accept the case in the 
October 2002 term.25 
A full understanding of the issues likely to guide the Supreme Court 
when it ultimately decides CIPA’s fate requires a review of the history of 
Congress’s attempts to restrict content on the Internet, the judicial reaction 
to each of those efforts before CIPA’s enactment, and Congress’s rationale 
and support for CIPA. Part II of this Article places CIPA in context by 
reviewing Congress’s early attempts to directly control Internet speech 
content through the passage of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)26 
and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)27 and the judicial reaction 
 
 
 20. Id. at 407 (enumerating plaintiffs’ constitutional claims). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 496. 
 23. Id. (explaining that school libraries are still compelled to use filtering or lose their E-rate and 
LSTA funds). See discussion of E-rate and LSTA funds infra Part III.B. 
 24. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, supra note 18, reads, in pertinent part: 
Appellate Review.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or final 
judgment, decree, or order of the court of three judges . . . holding this title or an amendment 
made by this title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a matter 
of right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 25. Had the three-judge panel in the CIPA challenge ruled that the statute was constitutional, the 
library community and other challengers of the Act would not have had a similar appeal as a matter of 
right to the Supreme Court. Rather, it appears that they, unlike the government, would have had to 
apply for certiorari and take their chances that the Supreme Court would grant their request for 
review. 
 26. Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, § 502. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. V 1999). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/1
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that greeted attempts to enforce each of those Acts. Whether through 
constitutional naivete or legislative hubris, Congress seriously 
underestimated the difficulty it would have controlling this new medium; 
the courts met congressional attempts to regulate the Internet with the 
development of a line of First Amendment cases that have firmly placed 
online communications within the ambit of protected speech.  
Part III examines Congress’s strategic shift away from direct 
proscriptions of online content and toward an attempt to control Internet 
speech indirectly through its spending power. This section reviews the 
resulting legislative development and implementation of CIPA and 
analyzes Congress’s attempts to portray CIPA as a routine use of its 
spending power.  
Part IV explores Congress’s use of its spending power as a regulatory 
tool. It reviews lines of cases addressing limits on the congressional 
spending power, conditional funding, and the intersection of the spending 
power and the First Amendment. It concludes that Congress’s attempt to 
recast CIPA’s central purpose as a routine use of its spending power rather 
than as a direct regulation of speech content must fail because the ultimate 
effect on protected speech content is no less profound than if it had been 
included in a direct statutory mandate to filter. Part IV further concludes 
that the proper standard of review of CIPA’s conditions is strict scrutiny.  
Finally, Part V applies strict First Amendment scrutiny to the 
conditions imposed by CIPA on public libraries.28 Part V and this Article 
conclude that the method chosen by the government in CIPA to regulate 
content on the Internet impermissibly undermines the essential nature and 
purpose of libraries as providers of multiple points of view and thus 
contravenes the First Amendment rights of both public libraries and their 
users.  
II. CONGRESS’S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL INTERNET SPEECH DIRECTLY 
Congress’s initial attempts to control Internet content came in the form 
of two assaults proscribing broad categories of online speech through 
direct statutory measures. Both pieces of legislation were greeted with a 
level of constitutional scrutiny that proved to be their undoing. The 
following review of the rise and fall of the CDA and COPA shows why 
Congress was left searching for less vulnerable means of applying existing 
 
 
 28. Because the purpose of schools and school libraries is substantially different than the purpose 
of public libraries and libraries in institutions of higher education, this Article does not address the 
constitutional implications of CIPA relative to schools. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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obscenity law to the Internet, a communications medium that, by virtue of 
its unique qualities and characteristics, resists the application of traditional 
speech content controls developed for other media.  
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 
In its first effort to directly control Internet content, Congress enacted 
the CDA.29 Not satisfied with a statute prohibiting the online transmission 
of obscenity and child pornography,30 neither of which have First 
Amendment protection regardless of the transmission medium used,31 
Congress embarked on a far higher-risk constitutional strategy that it 
hoped would shield minors from all online speech that it deemed harmful 
to them, regardless of its First Amendment status relative to adults. 
Specifically, Congress sought to extend the reach of the CDA to the 
transmission of two types of speech protected for adults by making it a 
criminal offense for anyone32 to knowingly transmit “indecent” materials 
to anyone under eighteen years of age,33 or to transmit any type of 
 
 
 29. See supra note 26. 
 30. Transmitting obscenity and child pornography is already prohibited by federal law. See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1464-1465 (criminalizing transmission of obscenity); 18 U.S.C §§ 2251-2252 (criminalizing 
transmission of child pornography). 
 31. Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 24 (1973) (ruling that a work may be subject to state regulation when (a) “the ‘average person, 
applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
prurient” sexual interests; (b) the work portrays sexual conduct in a “patently offensive way” as 
defined by applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole, has no serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value). 
 Similarly, child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. See New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (modifying the Miller standard in the case where a minor is visually depicted 
as engaged in lewd sexual acts, as defined by applicable state law). In such cases, the material need not 
be found to appeal to the prurient interests of the average person; the sexual conduct depicted need not 
be portrayed in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a 
whole. Id. at 764. See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (holding that states have such a 
strong interest in protecting children from the abuse that can stem from mere possession of child 
pornography that they can “constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing” of such material). 
But cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (refusing to extend the 
definition of child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict actual children but 
are, in fact, virtual (computer generated) images). 
 32. Congress clearly intended that the statute apply to all online transmissions, not just those by 
commercial purveyors of pornography. See 141 CONG. REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995). Unlike 
other obscenity statutes and Congress’s attempt to control “dial-a-porn” enacted or under consideration 
at the time, CDA sponsor Senator James Exon assured his colleagues that “there would be no 
noncommercial loophole in the new provisions.”). 141 CONG. REC. 15503 (1995). 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2001) states in pertinent part that: 
Whoever— 
(1) in interstate or foreign communications— 
 . . . .  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/1
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communication, in a manner that is available to a person under eighteen 
years of age, that depicts sexual content in a manner that is “patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.”34 
Apparently anticipating difficulty in gaining judicial approval of this 
approach, Congress attempted to insulate the statute from constitutional 
challenge by including affirmative defenses for those who restricted 
minors’ access to the proscribed materials by requiring that recipients of 
such offensive content verify their age through the use of a credit card or 
other adult identification information.35 Congress also provided an 
affirmative defense for those content providers who imposed other “good 
faith” access restrictions.36 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American 
Library Association (ALA) mounted an immediate challenge to the CDA 
in ACLU v. Reno (Reno I),37 contending that the “indecency” clause in 
§ 223(a)(1) and the “patently offensive” clause in § 223(d) could not 
withstand First Amendment scrutiny, as they were too vague regarding the 
categories of speech regulated and were subject to overly broad 
application.38 Agreeing with the plaintiffs, a three-judge panel of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the CDA.39 In response, the 
                                                                                                                         
 
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly— 
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
(ii) initiates the transmission of,  
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene 
or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, 
regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the 
communication; 
 . . . .  
(2) [or] knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for 
any activity prohibited in paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,  
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. 47 U.S.C. § 233(d) (2001). 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B) (2001). 
 36. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (2001). The CDA does not specify which measures taken to 
prevent minors’ access to the materials proscribed by the Act would give rise to an affirmative defense 
under this subsection. Instead, § 223(e)(5)(A) generally describes qualifying access control measures 
as those that are “taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate” to restrict minors’ 
access, including the use of “any method which is feasible under available technology.” Id. 
 37. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The ACLU 
and the ALA were joined by dozens of Internet service providers, online publishers, and other parties 
interested in the future of online communications. Id. See 521 U.S. at 861 nn.27-28 for complete lists 
of plaintiffs joining the ACLU and the ALA. 
 38. 929 F. Supp. at 828-29. 
 39. Id. at 883. 
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government appealed to the Supreme Court under expedited review 
provisions in the Act.40  
In Reno v. ACLU (Reno II)41 the Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s opinion, finding the CDA’s constitutional infirmities to be 
numerous and the government’s reliance on a number of the Court’s 
obscenity precedents to be flawed.42 In defending Congress’s attempts to 
regulate indecent and patently offensive speech that it felt could be 
harmful to minors, the government argued that the Court’s holdings in 
Ginsberg v. New York43 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation44 provided ample 
constitutional support for the validity of the CDA.45 In both cases, the 
Court had fashioned theories designed to give the state great latitude to 
protect minors from speech it deemed indecent and harmful to them, even 
if that same speech would be fully protected for adults by the First 
Amendment.46 
Ginsberg upheld a New York statute making it illegal to sell to minors 
material that the state legislature had classified as obscene for minors, 
even if the same material would not be obscene for adults.47 In so doing, 
the Court crafted a “variable obscenity” rule in which material that is fully 
protected for adults under the First Amendment can lose that protection 
when it is distributed to minors. The Ginsberg Court pointed to an 
“independent interest in the well-being of its youth” as the basis for a 
state’s decision concerning what is obscene for minors48 and required only 
that it be based on a legislature’s rational belief that minors accessing the 
proscribed material would be harmed if exposed to it.49  
In Pacifica, the Court had upheld sanctions that the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) levied against a radio station for 
 
 
 40. The expedited review provisions in the Computer Decency Act were virtually identical with 
those used in the Children’s Internet Protection Act. See supra notes 24-25.  
 41. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 42. Id. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 174 (1999). Professor 
Lessig observed that the Communications Decency Act “practically impaled itself on the First 
Amendment.” Id. 
 43. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 44. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 45. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 864-68. 
 46. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (“‘Because of the state’s exigent interest in preventing distribution 
to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare, and 
morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for 
adults.’”) (quoting Bookcase, Inc., v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 (“[T]he 
government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority in 
their own household’ justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”). 
 47. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634. 
 48. Id. at 640. 
 49. Id. at 643. 
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broadcasting comedian George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue on the 
public airwaves at a time in the afternoon when its repeated use of words 
dealing with excretory functions, sexual activities and sexual organs 
would likely be heard by children in the audience.50 The FCC had ruled 
that the broadcast’s content was “patently offensive” at the time of day it 
was aired, and that the monologue was indecent “as broadcast.”51 The 
Pacifica Court held that, in limited, specialized contexts (such as 
broadcasting), the government could regulate the time, place, and manner 
in which even constitutionally protected sex-oriented speech content can 
be transmitted if it finds such action necessary to protect children from 
exposure to harmful materials.52 
In Reno II, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on Ginsberg 
and Pacifica. The government argued that the New York statute upheld in 
Ginsberg and the FCC order upheld in Pacifica were analogous to the 
CDA because they all seek to regulate and control minors’ exposure to 
indecent, if not obscene, speech.53 In fact, the statute upheld in Ginsberg 
was far narrower in scope than the CDA. Describing the breadth of the 
CDA’s coverage as “wholly unprecedented,”54 the Court excoriated 
Congress for failing to limit the statute’s application to commercial 
speech55 and for ignoring the right of parents to consent to their children 
gaining access to the speech in question, neither of which was omitted 
from the statute tested in Ginsberg.56 The Court also recognized that, 
unlike the statute in Ginsberg, the CDA did not adequately define the 
standard to be used in determining what speech is indecent or patently 
offensive, and further expressed concern that Congress had made the CDA 
applicable to all under the age of eighteen rather than under the age of 
seventeen, as provided in the New York statute.57 
Similarly, in rejecting the comparison between the CDA and the FCC 
order upheld in Pacifica, the Reno II Court pointed out the narrowness of 
the latter ruling, which applied to one particular program on a particular 
 
 
 50. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751. 
 51. Id. at 731-32. 
 52. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 (“[T]he government's interest in the ‘“well-being of its youth”’ 
. . . justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain 
access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special 
treatment of indecent broadcasting.”). 
 53. 521 U.S. at 864. 
 54. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 865. 
 57. Id. at 865-67. 
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broadcast medium.58 Unlike the Internet, where a “series of affirmative 
steps” is required to obtain specific online content, media broadcasts 
containing unwelcome content typically come without warning and are 
received, “even by those too young to read,” without any affirmative 
preliminary actions taken by the listener.59 Despite the attractiveness of the 
Ginsberg and Pacifica holdings to the government in Reno II, the Court 
utterly rejected their applicability and utility as bases for saving the 
CDA.60  
In its attempt to cast the widest possible net over speech that it believed 
to be “indecent” and “patently offensive,” Congress failed to define 
explicitly the term “indecent” within the statute, leaving potential conflicts 
between those terms unresolved. The government argued that the CDA 
was no more vague than the Court’s obscenity standard developed in 
Miller v. California61 because both regulate works that present sexual 
material in a “patently offensive” manner.62 This argument ignores that the 
Miller obscenity test contains two other prongs that interrelate with, and 
narrow, the “patently offensive” prong developed there.63 Therefore, the 
government’s argument that Miller nullified the respondents’ vagueness 
argument was dismissed by the Court with the statement that “[j]ust 
because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it does not 
follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague.”64 
Indeed, the Court’s discomfort with the prospect of speech restrictions 
based only on juries deciding that speech is “patently offensive” according 
to community standards, without also having that speech tested for lack of 
prurient interest and for some type of serious value as required under the 
 
 
 58. Id. at 867. 
 59. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
 60. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 875 (“It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental 
interest in protecting children from harmful materials [citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 and Pacifica, 
438 U.S. at 749]. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech to 
adults.”). 
 61. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test for obscenity, which is still used today, rests on the 
following three prongs: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value. 
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 62. 521 U.S. at 873. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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Miller test, left the Court with the inescapable conclusion that the CDA’s 
use of the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” were impermissibly 
vague and overbroad to stand alone as a means of regulating speech.65 
Despite an acknowledged governmental interest in protecting children 
from exposure to harmful materials,66 the CDA’s attempted proscription of 
these vague categories of speech could not be applied without 
compromising a great deal of speech that adults have a constitutional right 
to receive and share with others.67  
As a last line of defense against the claim that anything that could not 
be safely viewed by a child could be found illegal under the CDA, the 
government pointed to a number of affirmative defenses provided under 
the Act to shield from prosecution those attempting to direct indecent or 
patently offensive speech to adults.68 Despite the government’s 
unsubstantiated claims that content ratings, software filters, and age 
verification programs could be effectively used to restrict children from 
gaining access to the proscribed speech, the Court recognized that no 
technological measure had yet been developed that provided unerring 
perfection at shielding children from objectionable content while at the 
same time allowing adults to gain access to that same speech.69 Taking 
note of the staggering number of Internet users worldwide,70 the myriad 
online communications modalities available to those users regardless of 
 
 
 65. Id. at 870-74. The Court recognized that Congress’s attempt to create a “community 
standard” based on the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” was so broad that it would have 
almost certainly encompassed “large amounts of non-pornographic material with serious educational 
or other value” (e.g., discussions about prison rape, sexual orientation, safe sex practices, artistic 
images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library). Id. at 877-
78. 
 66. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (recognizing that “the 
government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ . . . justified the regulation of otherwise protected 
expression”). 
 67. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 874 (“[T]he CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that 
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.”). Here, the Court merely 
follows its long-standing rule that adults have the right, under the First Amendment, to access 
“[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene.” Id. (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 68. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(e)(5)(A)-(B) (2001). 
 69. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 876-77. 
 70. “The Government estimates that ‘[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and 
that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999.’” Id. at 870. Despite the difficulty in measuring 
the number of Internet users at any given time, it is clear that these numbers are now significantly 
dated. As of September 2001, the Internet-use measurement firm of Nielsen/NetRatings placed the 
number of Americans who use the Internet at least once a month at 115.2 million and the number of 
Americans with Internet access, either at home or at work, at 176.5 million. See Susan Stellin, More 
Americans Online, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at C7. 
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their age,71 and the absence of any truly effective online age verification 
method,72 the Court concluded that the CDA could not be implemented 
without severely chilling the constitutionally protected speech of adults 
who would be required, under the CDA, to limit their online speech to that 
which could be safely shared with the children who might gain access to 
that speech.73 Consequently, the CDA lacked the precision required by the 
First Amendment for a statute that regulates the content of speech.74 In 
such cases, the statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve the 
government’s compelling interest—in this case, the protection of minors 
from exposure to harmful materials online—without excessively 
burdening the First Amendment rights of adults.75 The Court, noting that 
the government had failed to show that the CDA used the least restrictive 
alternative to achieve the government’s interests, ruled that the statute 
could not be constitutionally applied.76 
B. The Child Online Protection Act 
Undaunted by the spectacular failure of the Communications Decency 
Act, Congress attempted to cure the constitutional infirmities that had 
killed the CDA in its second statutory attempt to control Internet content 
directly—the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).77 In fact, while 
Congress tried to make COPA somewhat more refined and narrowly 
 
 
 71. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 879 (listing chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders as examples of 
the Internet’s many “modalities”). 
 72. Id. at 855-57. As pointed out in both Reno I and Reno II, there is no effective way to 
determine the age of a participant in the various forms of Internet communication. E-mail addresses 
reveal nothing about the age or true identity of the Internet speakers; broadcast mail exploders, such as 
listservs, send out communications to all subscribers’ computers without regard for the age of the 
person who might be using the computer at the time the message is received; and no technology exists 
that can alleviate these realities of Internet architecture. The use of credit cards and adult identification 
passwords, while a step in the right direction, are also far from foolproof, both because they can fall 
into the hands of minors and because the monetary and personal privacy costs associated with the use 
of such systems is likely to deter some adults from participating in speech in which they are 
constitutionally entitled to engage. 
 73. Id. at 871-72.  
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the absence of a viable age 
verification process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will 
likely view it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group 
will be minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent 
message—would surely burden communication among adults. 
Id. at 876-77. 
 74. Id. at 874. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 879. 
 77. Pub. L. No. 105-277, supra note 27. 
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focused than the CDA, the statute has proved to be laden with flaws that 
have, thus far, prevented its implementation.  
COPA imposes criminal sanctions on individuals or entities who, for 
commercial purposes, use the Internet to communicate or offer to 
communicate material that could be accessed by minors78 and that contains 
content that is “harmful to minors.”79 Unlike the CDA, communications by 
private parties are not regulated under COPA; instead, the statute targets 
only those “engaged in the business of making such communications.”80 In 
addition, Congress refined COPA’s scope regarding material it was 
attempting to prevent minors from viewing, abandoning the CDA’s 
impossibly vague “indecent” and “patently offensive” categories that had 
failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny in Reno II. Instead, COPA uses 
what lawmakers hoped would be a more meaningful and constitutionally 
defensible category of prohibited online speech—speech that is “harmful 
to minors.”81 Finally, COPA enumerates a series of age verification 
strategies that, if used by an online publisher, provide an affirmative 
defense to liability under the statute even if a minor does, in fact, gain 
access to the materials restricted by the statute.82 
A month before the statute was to take effect at the end of November 
 
 
 78. A “minor” is defined in COPA as “any person under 17 years of age.” 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(7). 
Compare the Communications Decency Act, which defined a minor as “any person under 18 years of 
age.” 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 79. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). 
 80. Id. § 231(e)(2)(A). 
 81. COPA states that online material will be considered “harmful to minors” only if each part of 
the following test is satisfied:  
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the 
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to 
pander to, the prurient interest; 
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an 
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted 
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
Id. § 231(e)(6). Congress expressed its feeling that such a standard complied with the definition of 
“harmful to minors” upheld by the Supreme Court. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 11-13 (1998) (citing 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968), modified by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973)). 
 82. Specifically, COPA states that: 
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith, 
has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors— 
(A) by requiring use of credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal 
identification number; 
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or 
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology. 
47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1). 
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1998, the ACLU and others83 challenged COPA on First and Fifth 
Amendment grounds in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and sought injunctive relief preventing the statute 
from taking effect in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno (Reno III).84 
The plaintiffs argued that the statute was facially invalid under the First 
Amendment because it both impermissibly burdened protected adult 
speech and violated the speech rights of minors.85 Additionally, the 
plaintiffs argued that the statute’s definition of material that is “harmful to 
minors” was unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fifth 
Amendments.86 The plaintiffs further contended that COPA was not the 
least restrictive alternative that the government could use to achieve its 
stated purpose of protecting minors from harmful Internet materials.87 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the affirmative defenses listed in COPA 
would be too expensive and technologically cumbersome to relieve the 
statute’s impermissible burden on protected speech.88  
As it had done in the earlier CDA challenge, the district court agreed 
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First 
Amendment claims and issued a temporary restraining order before the 
statute was implemented.89 This order was followed several months later 
by the issuance of a preliminary injunction barring the government from 
enforcing or prosecuting matters under COPA.90 The district court’s 
injunction rested on classic principles of analysis for cases in which 
protected speech is jeopardized by government regulation. Under these 
principles, nonobscene sexual expression is protected by the First 
Amendment,91 and content-based regulations of that expression, such as 
 
 
 83. The ACLU was joined by a variety of online content providers, Web site operators and other 
online commercial entities as plaintiffs in this action.  
 84. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) [hereinafter Reno III]. 
 85. Id. at 478-79. 
 86. Id. at 479. 
 87. Id. at 492. In particular, plaintiffs suggested that the use of software “blocking” or “filtering” 
technology by parents and by Internet service providers would be a far less restrictive means of 
achieving the government’s goal and at least as effective as the proscriptions on “harmful” speech 
mandated in COPA. Interestingly, among its findings of fact, the court described as “undisputed” that 
blocking and filtering technology does not work perfectly. Id. Specifically, the court acknowledged 
that software filters frequently block sites that are completely appropriate for minors and also fail to 
block sites that might be deemed inappropriate for minors. Id. Further, the court recognized that 
minors with patience and sufficient computer skills would be able to circumvent software filters and 
blocking devices. Id.  
 88. Id. at 479. 
 89. ACLU v. Reno, Civ. No. 98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998). 
 90. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 473. 
 91. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
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COPA, are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.92 The 
government may regulate protected speech content to fulfill a compelling 
state interest, but it is required to choose the least restrictive and most 
narrowly tailored means to satisfy the government’s interest without 
unduly compromising First Amendment freedoms.93 Although the district 
court simply assumed that COPA was based on Congress’s compelling 
interest in protecting minors from indecent materials,94 the court found that 
it was not apparent that the government could carry its burden of showing 
that the statute represented the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored 
means of achieving that goal, thereby leading to the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.95  
The government appealed the district court’s decision to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals (Reno IV).96 The court of appeals affirmed, but 
based its decision entirely on an issue that was not relied on below—that 
COPA’s use of “contemporary community standards” to identify material 
that is “harmful to minors” rendered the statute substantially overbroad.97 
The court of appeals reasoned that because Web publishers have no 
technological means of limiting access to their sites based on the 
geographic location of particular Internet users, the safest reading of 
COPA requires Web publishers either to censor materials to a level 
acceptable in the most restrictive community in the nation, or to shield 
“any material that might be deemed harmful by the most puritan of 
communities in any state . . .” behind age or credit card verification 
systems.98 Although the latter approach arguably protects Web publishers 
and prevents wholesale prophylactic content censorship, individuals over 
seventeen without the necessary age verification credentials would be 
denied access to protected materials, as would all minors under seventeen 
seeking access to materials not “deemed ‘harmful’ to them in their 
respective geographic communities.”99 Because of this resulting limitation 
 
 
 92. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally 
prevents government from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”); 
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
 93. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
 94. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)). 
 95. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97. While recognizing that final determinations on the First 
Amendment issues presented would have to await a trial on the merits, the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the categories of speech covered by COPA were excessively broad. Id. 
 96. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 
U.S. 1037 (2001), and vacated by 535 U.S. 564, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002) [hereinafter Reno IV]. 
 97. Id. at 173-74. 
 98. Id. at 175. 
 99. Id. 
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on free speech, the court of appeals held that “this aspect of COPA, 
without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding 
of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute.”100 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari101—renaming the 
case Ashcroft v. ACLU after the change in administrations—to review the 
findings of the court of appeals and subsequently vacated the Third 
Circuit’s judgment.102 The Supreme Court held that the use of “community 
standards” to identify “material that is harmful to minors” under COPA 
does not by itself render the statute facially unconstitutional.103 Beyond 
this core point, however, the Justices of the Supreme Court displayed deep 
philosophical divisions regarding exactly what “community standards” 
should mean in the context of the Internet, as demonstrated by the five 
opinions written to address this issue.104 Arguably, most philosophically 
troubling for future First Amendment protection of Internet content is the 
opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Rehnquist and 
Scalia. In it, Justice Thomas endorsed the constitutionality of COPA’s 
requirement subjecting Internet content to local community standards as a 
means of determining what Internet content is harmful to minors.105 
Seemingly ignoring the Reno II rejection of a Miller-like community 
standard criterion as applied to Internet content,106 Justice Thomas opined 
that “any variance caused by the statute’s reliance on community standards 
 
 
 100. Id. at 174. The court itself raised the issue of the inappropriateness of COPA’s reliance on 
“contemporary community standards” as the test of online content during oral argument. The court 
based its opinion on the apparent unconstitutionality of that clause alone, and did very little to address 
the numerous other constitutional issues raised by the district court. Id. at 173-74. 
 101. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 
U.S. 1037 (2001), and vacated by 535 U.S. 564, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002). 
 102. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002). 
 103. Id. at 1713. The Court stressed that the scope of its decision was “quite limited,” and clearly 
did not intend this holding to go beyond the facts and procedural posture of the current litigation 
testing the constitutionality of COPA. Id. Although the Court rejected the argument that COPA’s use 
of community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors, by itself, rendered the statute 
unconstitutional on its face, neither did a majority of the Court endorse any particular definition of 
community standards that it would hold, conclusively, to pass constitutional muster when used to 
judge whether or not Internet transmissions are, in fact, harmful to minors. “The fact that distributors 
of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal 
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 1711 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 104. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text. 
 105. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1703-14. 
 106. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78 (rejecting the “community standards criterion” as applied to 
the Internet because “any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the 
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message”). 
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is not substantial enough to violate the First Amendment.”107 Believing 
that there is no constitutional barrier to prohibiting communications that 
are obscene according to some communities’ standards even though they 
would not be obscene according to the standards in others, Justice Thomas 
concluded that the ultimate burden is on the Internet publisher to comply 
with all possible local prohibitions on obscene messages:108 
 If a publisher chooses to send its material into a particular 
community, this Court’s jurisprudence teaches that it is the 
publisher’s responsibility to abide by that community’s standards. 
The publisher’s burden does not change simply because it decides 
to distribute its material to every community in the Nation . . . . If a 
publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the standards 
of particular communities, then it need only take the simple step of 
utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material 
into those communities.109 
In separate opinions, Justices O’Connor110 and Breyer111 called for the 
development of national community standards for evaluating the 
constitutional status of sexual material on the Internet. Justice Kennedy 
 
 
 107. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1713. See generally Dennis W. Chiu, Comment, Obscenity 
on the Internet: Local Community Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information 
Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185 (1995); William D. Deane, Comment, COPA and 
Community Standards on the Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the 
Obscenity Standards in Las Vegas and New York? 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (2001); Erik G. Swenson, 
Comment, Redefining Community Standards in Light of the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet: 
A Critique of United States v. Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855 (1998). 
 108. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1711 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 125-26 (1989)). 
 109. Id. at 1712. Justice Thomas argued that this approach is virtually identical with Court 
precedent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and Sable Communications of California, 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In Hamling, a case challenging a statute prohibiting the mailing of 
obscene material, the Court held that “[t]he fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be 
subjected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they 
transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional . . . .” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 
106. In Sable, a case in which a statutory provision prohibited commercial “dial-a-porn” operators 
from using telephones to engage in obscene or indecent communications, the Court stated that “if [a 
dial-a-porn business’s] audience is comprised of different communities with different local standards, 
[the business] ultimately bears the burden of complying with the [local] prohibition on obscene 
messages.” Sable, 492 U.S. at 106. In his dissent in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice Stevens strongly 
criticized Justice Thomas’ reliance on Hamling and Sable, arguing that characteristics of mail and 
telephone communications allow distributors using those media to prevent transmissions into 
communities where content is likely to be viewed as obscene or indecent. Stevens pointed out that 
there is currently no way to effect this same type of geographic control for the transmission of Internet 
content. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1722-28. 
 110. Id. at 1714-15 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
 111. Id. at 1715-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
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(joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) cited the Reno III court’s 
concerns that COPA was overbroad, and that the question of community 
standards could not be evaluated without the court of appeals analyzing 
that issue on remand.112 Finally, Justice Stevens, in dissent, would have 
affirmed the Reno IV court’s opinion that the use of local community 
standards to evaluate Internet content renders COPA unconstitutional on 
its face.113  
Although Ashcroft v. ACLU provides a fascinating glimpse of the 
thinking of individual Supreme Court justices concerning the 
constitutional status of Internet speech, the opinion certainly does not 
provide a final determination concerning the constitutionality of COPA. 
The Court simply vacated and remanded the case to the court of appeals 
because it did not agree that the statute’s use of community standards as a 
means of identifying material that is “harmful to minors” is, by itself, 
fatal.114 Leaving in place the lower court’s injunction against enforcement 
of the statute, the Court reserved judgment on “whether COPA suffers 
from substantial overbreadth for other reasons, whether the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, or whether the District Court correctly 
concluded that the statute likely will not survive strict scrutiny analysis 
once adjudication of the case is completed below.”115 Once fact-finding 
has been completed and the court of appeals has ruled on the case on its 
merits, it is very likely that the Supreme Court will again be given the 
chance to decide the ultimate fate of COPA. 
C. First Amendment Principles Emerging from the CDA and COPA 
Challenges 
The litigation surrounding the CDA and COPA challenges proved to be 
the battleground where First Amendment principles were first applied to 
the realm of online speech. Emerging from these decisions are a number of 
legal rulings and factual determinations that form the jurisprudential 
standards against which statutes similar to the CDA and COPA will be 
analyzed. Perhaps as importantly, these principles served as a reality check 
to Congress’s would-be Internet censors, providing notice that the courts 
and the Constitution would not allow Congress to run roughshod over 
Internet speech. 
 
 
 112. Id. at 1716-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 113. Id. at 1722-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 1713-14. 
 115. Id. at 1713. 
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1. Standard of Review 
Both the CDA and COPA were adjudged to be government-imposed, 
content-based restrictions on speech that was characterized by Congress, 
almost interchangeably, as “indecent,” “patently offensive,” or “harmful to 
minors.”116 In analyzing the constitutionality of both statutes’ regulatory 
schemes, the courts called upon a number of core First Amendment 
principles as the foundation for their decisions.117  
Even when it may be distasteful and offensive to some, speech that is 
neither obscene nor child pornography is constitutionally protected for 
adults.118 Because of this protection, governmental content-based 
regulations of protected speech are presumed to violate the First 
Amendment119 and are upheld only when found to promote a compelling 
state interest.120 Even then, most of these regulations will be strictly 
scrutinized under the First Amendment,121 not only to determine whether 
the stated interest is sufficiently “compelling” in the constitutional sense, 
but also to assure that the government chooses the least restrictive and 
most narrowly tailored means of achieving its regulatory interests without 
unnecessarily burdening First Amendment rights.122 In evaluating 
government regulations of protected expression, the courts require that the 
benefits gained by enforcement of the challenged statute outweigh the 
burden imposed on speech for the regulation to stand a chance of being 
validated.123  
In limited situations, the courts have endorsed less than strict scrutiny 
review of government regulations of indecent speech. Most noteworthy is 
the area of broadcasting where, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,124 the 
Supreme Court endorsed extremely broad Federal Communications 
Commission administrative sanctions against a radio broadcaster for airing 
George Carlin’s now infamous “Filthy Words” monologue125 at a time 
 
 
 116. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93; Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 857. 
 117. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93; Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 857. 
 118. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that adults’ access to indecent speech is protected by the First 
Amendment). See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48. 
 119. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
 120. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
 121. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994), vacated by, 512 U.S. 
1230 (1994) (“Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, 
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”) (citing Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 122. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
 123. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976). 
 124. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 125. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755 (appendix containing transcript of monologue). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1025 Hinckley book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:31 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1046 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1025 
 
 
 
 
likely to be heard by children.126 In Reno I and Reno II, the government 
argued that Congress’s interest in shielding minors from exposure to 
indecent Internet content was at least as compelling as the FCC’s control 
of broadcast content and that the CDA should be reviewed under the same 
reduced level of constitutional scrutiny as that endorsed for broadcast 
regulations in Pacifica.127 The courts, however, rejected the comparison, 
holding that the unique characteristics of broadcasting that allow 
government regulation to survive a reduced level of First Amendment 
scrutiny do not exist for the Internet.128 Whereas the availability of, and 
access to, broadcast signals is a scarce, expensive commodity in need of 
government regulation to assure that it is used in the public interest,129 the 
Internet has been described as a “vast democratic forum[]” used by over 
one hundred million people in the United States alone to access content 
“as diverse as human thought.”130 In addition, while broadcast media have 
been described as “uniquely pervasive” in their ability to enter homes and 
deliver unwelcome content without warning,131 Internet communications 
require affirmative steps to be taken before information is delivered to 
one’s computer.132 Finally, the courts recognize that there is a history of 
extensive government regulation of broadcasting that they can rely on 
when scrutinizing regulations of related media.133 By contrast, the 
Internet’s phenomenal public growth has occurred devoid of government 
regulation.134  
Having rejected the comparison to broadcast media, the Supreme Court 
has concluded that the proper level of First Amendment review for 
 
 
 126. Id. at 750-51. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, stopping far short of 
granting a categorical government prohibition of offensive speech. Rather, the Court endorsed the 
F.C.C.’s authority to regulate broadcasts of speech that, though not inherently offensive if aired at 
times unlikely to be heard by children, is unsuitable for broadcast when children are likely to hear 
them. Id. at 750. 
 127. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 866-67; Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 850. 
 128. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 866-67 (“[T]he Court concluded that the ease with which children may 
obtain access to broadcasts . . . justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting.”); Reno I, 929 F. 
Supp. at 862 (“[T]he Court [in Pacifica] emphasized that its narrow holding applied only to 
broadcasting which is ‘uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.’”). 
 129. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 868 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 
(1994)). 
 130. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (quoting Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 842). 
 131. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
 132. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 869 (“[C]ommunications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an 
individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content ‘by 
accident.’”) (quoting Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 844). 
 133. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 868 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400).  
 134. Id. 
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government regulation of Internet content is strict scrutiny.135 The 
threshold question in any strict scrutiny analysis must be whether the 
government can demonstrate that it does, in fact, have a constitutionally 
compelling state interest in regulating speech.136 Absent a constitutionally 
sufficient compelling state interest, the remaining elements of strict 
scrutiny analysis need not be examined.137 In theory, this demonstration 
requires more than an unsupported claim by the government designed to 
elicit visceral public reaction and stir public support. First Amendment 
jurisprudence requires the government to meet exacting standards when it 
moves to regulate protected speech. As the strict scrutiny standard has 
developed in First Amendment cases, “compelling” does not mean simply 
that the government’s interest is legitimate or important; rather, the 
government must demonstrate that its interest in regulating speech aims at 
avoiding harms that are “real, not merely conjectural, and that the 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.”138  
Application of these principles means that the mere existence of 
indecent material on the Internet and government concern over its possible 
effects on children should not be ruled sufficient to satisfy the test for 
compelling state interest; the government should be required to prove 
actual harm to children from exposure to indecent materials online and 
that its proposed regulation of certain online speech can, in fact, alleviate 
that harm. However, touching the hot button of “child protection” has long 
 
 
 135. In rejecting the reduced level of First Amendment scrutiny afforded to regulation of 
broadcast content, the Court chose to allow this new medium to develop unburdened by heavy-handed 
federal regulation. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 870 (“We agree with [the district court’s] conclusion that 
our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied 
to this medium.”). Commentators have recognized the importance of the Court’s determination that 
regulations of Internet speech would be subjected to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. See, 
e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: On the Difference in Importance 
Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court’s 1996-
97 Term, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2259 (1998). 
In analyzing [Reno II], the doctrinal significance of according speech on the Internet the 
strongest degree of First Amendment protection should not be minimized. Underscoring the 
Internet’s importance for free expression by referring to its “vast democratic fora,” and 
observing that the medium allows its users to “become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox,” the Court declined the Government’s 
invitation to allow the kind of regulatory leeway that had been granted to Congress over the 
broadcast media.  
Id. at 2283. 
 136. Ross, supra note 7, at 460 (“The state must both articulate and demonstrate a compelling 
interest based on a real harm in order to justify any government regulation on the content of speech.”). 
 137. Id. (“According to First Amendment doctrine, courts may not even evaluate whether a given 
regulation is narrowly tailored until the state establishes its compelling interest.”). 
 138. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). 
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been used to win political support for censorship of various media,139 and 
the courts have demonstrated a willingness to allow the government a 
“free pass” by presuming that any governmental regulation promulgated in 
the name of protecting children is constitutionally compelling.140  
Even if Congress’s interest in protecting children is found by the courts 
to be sufficiently compelling to pass the initial hurdle of First Amendment 
analysis, the government carries an extremely heavy burden of proving 
that the method chosen to restrict speech is the least restrictive means 
available to satisfy the governmental interest and, further, that the 
restriction is narrowly tailored to avoid unduly compromising the 
fundamental right of free speech.141 In Reno II, the Court concluded that 
the extraordinary breadth of online communications made even serious 
adult online speech about sexual matters subject to criminal prosecution 
under the CDA if it were intercepted by a minor.142 The Court recognized 
that, by forcing adults to modify otherwise protected speech in order to 
make it acceptable for minors who might be listening, the CDA was not 
narrowly tailored to avoid a chilling effect on protected adult speech.143 
COPA fared no better on this point in Reno III, where the district court 
stated that it was unlikely that the government could meet its burden to 
 
 
 139. Ross, supra note 7, at 467 (“[T]he implicit promise of judicial deference invites legislators 
and advocates of censorship to abridge speech with relative abandon.”). 
 140. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 875 (“It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental 
interest in protecting children from harmful materials.”) (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 
438 U.S. at 749)). This governmental interest has been extended to include “shielding [minors] from 
materials that are not obscene by adult standards.” Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Sable, 492 
U.S. at 126; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40). See also Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 
2d 401, 471 (stating that “[t]he government’s interest in preventing the dissemination of obscenity, 
child pornography, or, in the case of minors, material harmful to minors, is well-established.”). But see 
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 853, where Chief Circuit Judge Sloviter provided a rare example of judicial 
skepticism about whether the government had done enough to show that its interest in regulating the 
“vast range of online material covered or potentially covered by the CDA” was compelling. 
Ultimately, and without elaboration, Judge Sloviter agreed that “there is certainly a compelling 
government interest to shield a substantial number of minors from some of the online material that 
motivated Congress to enact the CDA.” Id. But cf. Ross, supra note 7, at 429 (“Confronted with the 
incantation that the state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the Supreme 
Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged by the government.”). 
 141. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 879. 
 142. Id. at 871. Absent a clear definition of the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” in the 
CDA, the Court wondered if a speaker could “confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth 
control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica 
opinion, or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA.” Id. The Court concluded that 
“[t]his uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the 
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials.” Id. 
 143. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 874-75 (“‘[R]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest’ in 
protecting children, ‘[t]he level of discourse . . . cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a 
sandbox.’”) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)). 
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show that the statute used the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored 
means to protect minors from gaining online access to commercial 
pornography.144 Specifically, the court observed that there is no effective 
way to ensure that commercial pornography will not show up on foreign 
Websites, on noncommercial Websites, or through other direct peer-to-
peer exchanges, none of which were within the scope of COPA 
coverage.145 In a manner similar to the CDA, leaving commercial and 
noncommercial Website operators vulnerable to criminal prosecution for 
distribution of protected adult speech that, through no fault of their own, is 
distributed somewhere on the Internet and accessed by a minor has a 
chilling effect on that protected speech.146  
In stripping the government of its claim to the high moral ground and 
forcing it to justify its actions under the harsh lamp of strict scrutiny, the 
Reno decisions revealed both the CDA and COPA to be ill-disguised 
attempts to censor Internet content broadly—not just protecting children 
from accessing constitutionally unprotected material, but making an entire 
category of offensive, although fully protected, speech inaccessible for 
everyone, adults and children, alike. 
2. Inability and Impracticality of Using Current Technology to 
Regulate Online Speech within Constitutional Bounds 
A hallmark of the government’s defense of its statutory attempts to 
regulate online speech is the apparent underlying assumption that effective 
technological solutions exist that can limit children’s exposure to harmful 
material on the Internet without compromising adults’ First Amendment 
rights. The government’s arguments in defense of the CDA and COPA 
included claims that online age verification, adult identification 
techniques, and content ratings could be used to shield transmitters of 
indecent material from liability under the statutes.147 However, the courts 
have shown an unexpected level of appreciation for the limitations of these 
technologies, and these limitations have been consistently noted in the 
 
 
 144. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 145. Id. at 496 (“[T]his Court's finding that minors may be able to gain access to harmful to 
minors materials on foreign Web sites, non-commercial sites, and online via protocols other than http 
demonstrates the problems this statute has with efficaciously meeting its goal.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (listing the affirmative defenses available under COPA); 
Reno II, 521 U.S. at 860 (“[T]he CDA provided two affirmative defenses to prosecution: (1) the use of 
a credit card or other age verification system, and (2) any good faith effort to restrict access by 
minors.”). 
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developing body of First Amendment law dealing with online speech.148 
The courts are aware that age verification using credit cards and adult 
identification numbers is not only technically possible, but is, in fact, 
actually used by providers of adult content on the Internet.149 The courts 
also realize, however, that maintenance of an age verification process is 
not without costs150 and that, for noncommercial online speakers, these 
processes may be “economically and practically unavailable.”151 
Even where Congress attempted to ameliorate this problem in COPA 
by limiting the scope of online speech regulation to commercial speakers, 
the courts recognized the dilemma that such speakers face if they are 
required to use technologies that all agree cannot possibly verify the 
identity, age, or physical location of everyone who might possibly gain 
access to their sites.152 Commercial speakers faced with high costs of age 
verification systems are likely to avoid the problem by refusing to publish 
controversial speech.153 Further, with no way to be sure that minors will 
 
 
 148. See, e.g., Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487-92 (presenting extensive findings of fact concerning 
technological flaws in the use of credit cards, adult-access numbers, and filtering software that limit 
their effectiveness to verify age of Internet users); Reno II, 521 U.S. at 882 (agreeing with the Reno I 
court that the “Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques [online use 
of credit cards and adult identification numbers] actually preclude minors from posing as adults”); 
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846-48 (findings of fact detailing the technological impracticalities of three 
potential affirmative defenses under the CDA: credit card verification, use of adult identification 
numbers or passwords to verify age, and tagging of online content to label it as containing indecent or 
patently offensive speech). 
 149. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Reno II, 521 U.S. at 856, 876. 
 150. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488. Testimony received during the Pennsylvania District Court’s 
examination of the motion to enjoin enforcement of COPA details the technical complexity and 
significant expense involved in using credit card verification on the Internet. The court heard 
testimony that initial start-up costs of approximately $300 to “thousands of dollars” to set up one’s 
own secure server are typical, and that per transaction fees are borne by the online content provider 
thereafter. Id. Online content providers have the option of contracting with a third party to manage 
their online credit card verification processes, but, although unspecified in the accompanying 
testimony, the courts recognize that these services are not inexpensive to use. Id.  
 151. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846. 
 152. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495; Reno II, 521 U.S. at 855, 876, 881-82. By its very nature, the 
Internet makes it virtually impossible to determine the age and physical location of those engaged in 
online communications. This difficulty is particularly present in the case of the most public of Internet 
forums—chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web—which are openly accessible to all 
comers. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 845.  
In assessing the burden placed on protected speech by COPA, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the unique factors that affect communication in the new and technology-laden 
medium of the Web . . . [T]he plaintiffs have presented evidence that the nature of the Web 
and the Internet is such that Web site operators and content providers cannot know who is 
accessing their sites, or from where, or how old the users are, unless they take affirmative 
steps to gather information from the user and the user is willing to given [sic] them truthful 
responses. 
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
 153. See, e.g., id.; Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877. 
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not slip through the age verification safety net, online publishers and 
speakers are likely to aggressively self-censor materials that would result 
in criminal charges if accessed by minors, but that are fully protected adult 
speech.154 Finally, commercial online publishers are unlikely to provide 
access to protected adult speech if their potential customers refuse to use 
their sites because they dislike having to endure cumbersome identity 
verification procedures.155  
Although both the CDA and COPA suggest that parties making “good 
faith” efforts to apply technologies designed to keep minors from 
accessing indecent speech would be shielded from prosecution under those 
statutes, Congress was very careful not to specify what technology 
applications would be “good enough” to qualify as an affirmative defense 
under either Act.156 Tagging or rating of Internet content was mentioned 
by the government in Reno I and Reno II as an example of what Congress 
must have meant when it added a catch-all “good faith” affirmative 
defense to prosecution under the CDA.157 Specifically, the government 
suggested that Web content providers who embedded coded descriptions 
(so-called metatags) in Web pages containing indecent or patently 
offensive materials would have such a defense because end-users could 
install software filters on their computers set to screen out content 
containing those tags.158 Although the Reno I and Reno II courts rejected 
the government’s argument that a content-tagging defense saved the CDA 
from its First Amendment fate because the technology described did not 
fully exist at that time, both courts presciently predicted the constitutional 
infirmities that content rating systems would exhibit once developed in the 
 
 
 154. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 494-95. 
 155. Id. at 495. 
 156. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) states in pertinent part that: 
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution [under the “indecency” and “patently offensive” provisions 
of the CDA] . . . that a person— 
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the 
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified . . . which 
may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, 
including any method which is feasible under available technology . . . . 
47 U.S.C. § 223(e). 
 157. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 881 (“[R]elying on the ‘good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate 
actions’ provision, the Government suggests that ‘tagging’ provides a defense that saves the 
constitutionality of the CDA.”); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 878 n.20 (incorporating into its opinion a letter 
from the Department of Justice that expressed the position that “tagging by content providers coupled 
with evidence that the tag would be screened by the marketplace of browsers and blocking software” 
would satisfy the CDA’s good faith defense). 
 158. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 856. 
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years following the CDA litigation.159 For content tagging to be truly 
effective at shielding Internet publishers from liability, ratings would have 
to be uniformly and accurately applied by content providers. Even then, as 
the Supreme Court pointed out, there would be no way for Internet 
publishers to be sure that all potential recipients were using screening 
software that would recognize the metatags and block indecent or patently 
offensive materials if they chose not to receive them.160 Without this 
“impossible knowledge,” the Court recognized that a transmitter of CDA-
proscribed materials could not be sure that content rating would be 
“effective” and would thereby be left vulnerable to prosecution under the 
statute.161  
D. Direct Congressional Regulation of Online Content Thwarted 
As First Amendment cases go, neither the CDA nor COPA presented 
the greatest constitutional challenges. Both statutes were drafted without 
the slightest sensitivity for classic First Amendment pitfalls and were 
essentially dead on arrival at the courthouse.162 At least one commentator 
believes that a more carefully drafted statute than either the CDA or 
COPA could directly regulate Internet content and survive constitutional 
scrutiny,163 but the resounding defeat of the CDA in Reno I and Reno II 
and the seemingly perpetual injunction against enforcement being endured 
by COPA certainly cast this opinion into doubt.  
Clearly, advocates of online censorship needed to find a more 
sophisticated First Amendment approach to achieve significant regulation 
of Internet content. They believe that they have found it in Congress’s 
power of the purse. 
 
 
 159. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 881 (recognizing the lack of any guarantees that online speakers will 
actually “tag” their materials and the absence of screening software that can interact with content tags 
to ensure that minors cannot receive transmission deemed harmful to them. Because the CDA requires 
that good faith actions be “effective,” the Court describes tagging as an “illusory” defense under the 
Act. Id.). Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 878 (expressing doubt that tagging is a defense under the CDA). 
 160. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 881. 
 161. Id. In theory, the problems of voluntary Web content ratings could be resolved through the 
application of a government-mandated standard rating system and distribution of compatible screening 
software. Such a mandate is rife with constitutional problems and, as Professor Lawrence Lessig has 
observed, would likely lead to far more speech being filtered than is within the legitimate interest of 
the government. Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 665 (1998). 
 162. COPA retains a pulse, albeit weak, at the time of this writing. Enforcement of COPA having 
been enjoined from the outset, it has endured three judicial hearings, none of which has reached the 
merits of the case. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 163. See Lessig, supra note 161. 
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III. CONGRESS’S REGULATION OF SPEECH INDIRECTLY THROUGH ITS 
SPENDING POWER: THE CHILDREN’S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT 
A. Congress’s Enactment of the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
Stung by the debacle of the CDA and COPA challenges, and 
recognizing just how difficult it would be to directly control Internet 
content, those members of Congress bent on bringing governmental 
control to online speech devised what they believe is an ingenious and 
constitutionally invulnerable strategy to accomplish this goal through 
indirect means. That strategy, based on contingent offers of federal funds 
rather than statutory proscription to accomplish regulation of Internet 
content, is embodied in the Children’s Internet Protection Act164 (CIPA).  
Like the failed statutory attempts to regulate Internet content before it, 
CIPA’s ultimate goal is the regulation of online speech that Congress finds 
objectionable, particularly when viewed by minors. However, Congress 
hopes that the critical difference that will make CIPA immune from 
constitutional attack lies in the mechanism used to effect Internet 
regulation. CIPA, unlike the CDA and COPA, does not directly proscribe 
general categories of Internet content.165 Instead, CIPA seeks to regulate 
online speech indirectly by pressuring, rather than mandating, schools and 
public libraries to adopt software filters and other specific steps to reduce 
minors’ access to illegal and harmful materials on their Internet-accessible 
computers.166 The law applies that pressure to adopt filtering, not directly 
through threat of criminal or civil penalties, but indirectly by declaring 
that any school or library that refuses to apply filters is ineligible to 
 
 
 164. Children’s Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (Supp. 2001); 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134 
(Supp. 2001). 
 165. E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children’s Internet Protection Act: Hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Rep. W. J. “Billy” Tauzin, Chairman) (“[CIPA] is 
designed as a condition on receiving federal funds. This is unlike past attempts by Congress to address 
the availability of such material, which enacted straight bans or imposed access requirements.”). 
 166. For its proponents, the supposed constitutional cleverness of CIPA’s approach to filtering is 
that it does not actually mandate the application of this technology at every school and library; rather, 
it makes federal universal service funding contingent upon a school or library’s certification that they 
are filtering their Internet accessible computers. See, e.g., Rep. Charles W. Pickering, TalkBack Live: 
Filtering the Internet for Children: Censorship or Protection (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 20, 
2000) (transcript available at http:www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0010/20/tl.00.html)  
[W]e need to remember this is not a mandate: It is only saying that if [schools and libraries] 
accept federal funds, [they] should use these technologies as a tool to protect our children. If 
they decide not to use these funds, then they do not have to—to use the filter technologies or 
block it out. 
Id. 
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receive critically needed federal technology funding despite being eligible 
for these funds in all other respects.167 Rather than being compelled by 
statute to filter, these institutions are given the choice, albeit a Hobson’s 
choice, of installing filters or continuing to provide unfiltered access to the 
Internet, realizing all too well that, under CIPA, they will lose their 
eligibility for federal technology funds if they choose not to comply with 
the statute’s filtering mandate.168 
Hardly an instant success, the legislation languished for two years in 
Congress due to its sponsors’ inability to gain consensus support in both 
chambers.169 Despite failing to win passage on its own merits, CIPA was 
finally enacted into law when its supporters were able to include it as an 
eleventh-hour rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001.170 
Although President Clinton expressed public misgivings at the wisdom 
(and constitutionality) of this law, he was left with little alternative but to 
accept CIPA in order to avoid a politically damaging year-end battle over 
the federal budget.171  
 
 
 167. See Lowell A. Reid, Jr., Symposium: Napster & Beyond: Protecting Copyright in the Digital 
Millennium: Tending the Virtual Village Green: The Internet, the First Amendment, and the Federal 
Judge, 20 TEMP. ENVT’L. L. & TECH. J. 1, 5 (2001) (noting that, unlike the CDA and COPA, CIPA 
“has no criminal sanctions or civil fines; instead it imposes the sanction of withholding federal funding 
from violators.”). 
 168. “CIPA requires libraries that participate in the LSTA and E-rate programs to certify that they 
are using software filters on their computers to protect against visual depictions that are obscene, child 
pornography, or in the case of minors, harmful to minors.” Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 
201 F. Supp. 2d at 412. 
 169. Senator John McCain, CIPA’s first and biggest congressional booster, introduced versions of 
this legislation, beginning with S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998) and S. 97, 106th Cong. (1999). Although 
both bills received strong Senate support, neither gained support of both chambers, and the entire 
effort garnered its share of critical press coverage. See, e.g., Christopher Hunter, Don’t Let McCain 
Censor the Net, SALON.COM, Oct. 25, 2000, at http://dir.salon.com/tech/log/2000/10/25/filter 
_legislation/index.html (taking the view that CIPA’s requirement that public libraries filter Internet 
content is unnecessary and unconstitutional); Rico Gagliano, Public E-Enemy No. 1?, LA WEEKLY, 
Feb. 25, 2000, at 12. 
 170. Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-41, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 171. At the December 22, 2000, signing of the budget bill containing CIPA, President Clinton 
stated that he was “very disappointed” that Congress had chosen to invoke a filtering mandate, stating 
that he preferred to leave it up to localities to develop policies to govern acceptable use of the Internet 
that meet their own diverse needs in schools and libraries. Further, he expressed skepticism that 
software filters could effectively, and constitutionally, be applied: “[B]ecause current technology may 
not be able to differentiate between harmful and non-harmful expression with precision, [CIPA’s] 
provisions may have the effect of limiting access to valuable information in a manner that offends our 
tradition of freedom of speech.” See Gordon Flagg, Congress Mandates Internet Filters; Resistance on 
Court Expected on Freedom of Speech Issues, AM. LIBRARIES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 14. 
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B. CIPA Specifics 
In making schools and public libraries its battleground for a fight 
against smut on the Internet, Congress placed significant limitations on a 
number of meritorious federal programs it had created less than a decade 
earlier—programs specifically implemented to help these same institutions 
gain access to the Internet.172 All of the major technology funding 
programs directly affected by CIPA were established to ensure widespread 
exposure to the educational benefits of the Internet, and one was created 
specifically to address the disparity of Internet access between wealthy and 
poor school districts. 
Specifically, CIPA amends three federal statutes that provide funding 
sources upon which many schools and libraries depend to meet various 
costs associated with gaining access to the Internet. Simply put, CIPA 
applies to any school or library that receives “universal service” (better 
known as “E-rate”) discounts for Internet access, Internet service, and 
internal network wiring and connections,173 or that receives funds under 
either the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)174 or the 
Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA)175 to pay for Internet access 
or to purchase computers. Under CIPA, schools and libraries are ineligible 
to receive funds from any of these programs unless they certify that on 
every computer capable of accessing the Internet they have adopted, and 
are enforcing, a “technology protection measure” designed to prevent 
those computers from being used to access visual depictions that are 
obscene or are child pornography.176  
 
 
 172. CIPA’s supporters claim that the connection between federal programs supporting school and 
library Internet access and the government’s desire to keep harmful online materials out of the hands 
of minors is natural and justifiable. As public policy, however, cynics argue that CIPA is a thinly 
veiled attempt to compromise the results of a hard-fought and controversial congressional battle that 
had led to the commitment of public funds in 1996 to encourage universal access to the Internet. Never 
the darling of CIPA’s conservative sponsors, the E-rate program is caught in Congress’s crosshairs and 
is being smothered under a bureaucratic blanket completely unanticipated by Congress when it enacted 
the E-rate program and the other funding programs in question. See, e.g., THE E-RATE IN AMERICA: A 
TALE OF FOUR CITIES 7-15 (Benton Foundation, Andy Carvin ed., 2000). 
 173. See CIPA § 1721(a) & (b) (both amending the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 254(h)). 
 174. Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, see CIPA § 1711 
(amending Title 20 to add § 3601). 
 175. See CIPA § 1712 (amending the Museum and Library Services Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134). 
 176. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(5)(C), 6(C) (establishing E-rate recipient certification requirements with 
respect to any adult users’ access to obscenity and child pornography); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(a)(2)(A) 
(enumerating ESEA recipient certification requirements with respect to any users’ access to obscenity 
and child pornography); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(B) (listing LSTA recipient certification requirements 
with respect to any users’ access to obscenity and child pornography). Under § 254(h)(7)(E), the term 
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Not satisfied targeting just those categories of speech that have no 
constitutional protection and are clearly illegal for use by anyone,177 
Congress stretched CIPA’s reach into far more tenuous First Amendment 
grounds, requiring schools and libraries to certify that any technology 
protection measure installed also be capable of blocking or filtering 
materials that are “harmful to minors”178 when computers are being used 
by individuals under the age of seventeen.179 In addition, those schools and 
libraries seeking E-rate funds face the additional requirement of adopting 
what CIPA calls an “Internet safety policy.”180 By the terms of the Act, 
this policy must address a number of specific concerns related to minors’ 
use of the Internet, including online access to “inappropriate matter;”181 
the safety and security of minors online; unauthorized access, hacking, and 
other unlawful activities by minors; unauthorized disclosure, use and 
dissemination of minors’ personal identifying information; and the 
                                                                                                                         
 
“obscenity” is defined as having the meaning given such term in 18 U.S.C. § 1460; under 
§ 254(h)(7)(F), the term “child pornography” is defined as having the meaning given such term in 18 
U.S.C. § 2256. 
 177. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, reh’g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957) 
(holding that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech”). 
 178. “Harmful to minors” is defined identically in all three statutes as follows: 
The term “harmful to minors” means any picture, image, graphic image file, or visual 
depiction that— 
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeal to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion; 
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is 
suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated 
normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(e)(6); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7)(B). Essentially, this reduced 
standard of obscenity is patterned after the “obscene for minors” standards endorsed by the Court in 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975). 
 179. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B), 6(B) (listing E-rate recipient certification requirements with 
respect to Internet access by minors); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(a)(1)(A) (enumerating ESEA recipient 
certification requirements with respect to Internet access by minors); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A) 
(establishing LSTA recipient certification requirements with respect to Internet access by minors). A 
“minor,” as defined by CIPA, is “any individual who has not attained the age of 17 years.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 254(h)(7)(D). 
 180. 47 U.S.C. § 254(l). See also Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 
422 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding that “[a]pproximately 95% of libraries with public Internet access have 
some form of ‘acceptable use’ policy or ‘Internet use’ policy governing patrons’ use of the Internet. 
These policies set forth the conditions under which patrons are permitted to access and use the 
library’s Internet resources”). 
 181. CIPA leaves the definition of “inappropriate matter” to local communities, specifically, to a 
“school board, local educational agency, library, or other authority responsible for making the 
determination.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(l)(2). The determinations made by these local agencies are not 
reviewable by the federal government. Id. 
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identification and use of measures designed to keep minors from accessing 
harmful materials.182 At least one public hearing, following adequate 
public notice, must be held by libraries and schools covered under this 
section to review their proposed Internet safety policies.183 
Although CIPA amends all three affected technology funding programs 
to allow technology protection measures to be disabled by authorized 
authorities184 “to enable access [for] bona fide research or other lawful 
purposes,”185 institutions receiving E-rate funds are only allowed to do so 
for adult computer users.186 Under no circumstances is a school or library 
receiving E-rate funds allowed to provide unfiltered Internet access for 
minors.187 The statute leaves unexplained why the same requirement is not 
applied to ESEA and LSTA fund recipient schools and libraries, which are 
allowed to disable their technology protection measures for bona fide 
research and other lawful purposes without regard to the age of the user.188 
C. Government Rationale for CIPA 
In CIPA, Congress believes that it has finally found an approach to 
regulate Internet content that can survive constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, 
unlike the CDA and COPA, CIPA does not directly proscribe speech of 
any kind. Nor does CIPA attempt to enforce criminal or even civil 
penalties for its violation as the flawed federal statutes that preceded it had 
 
 
 182. Id. § 254(l)(1)(A). 
 183. Id. § 254(l)(B). 
 184. All three funding statutes affected by CIPA define a person who is allowed to disable 
technology protection measures as “an administrator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the 
certifying authority.” See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) for schools and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) for 
libraries receiving E-rate discounts; 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) for schools receiving ESEA funds; and 20 
U.S.C. § 9134 (f)(3) for libraries receiving LSTA funds. 
 185. None of the affected statutes’ disabling provisions define the terms “bona fide research” or 
“other lawful purpose.” See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) for schools and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) for 
libraries receiving E-rate discounts; 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) for schools receiving ESEA funds; and, 20 
U.S.C. § 9134 (f)(3) for libraries receiving LSTA funds. This lack of definition was a significant factor 
in American Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See discussion 
infra, Part V.C.3. 
 186. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(5)(D), (6)(D). 
 187. Id. Schools and libraries receiving E-rate funds cannot provide unfiltered access even to 
minors whose parents have specifically given them permission to gain such access. The court in 
American Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 U.S. 401 noted that, unlike the variable obscenity 
law reviewed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), CIPA does not allow parents the 
authority to permit their children to access materials that would be otherwise proscribed by the statute. 
The court also noted that this omission from CIPA was shared by the Communications Decency Act, 
which the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional in Reno II. See Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 201 
F. Supp. 2d at 482. 
 188. See 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) and 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) for disabling technology protection 
measures for ESEA and LSTA recipients, respectively. 
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done. The law’s proponents admit that they seek to impose conditions on 
federal funding in order to induce fund recipients to assist in governmental 
efforts to shield minors from online access to materials that they believe to 
be harmful.189 Proponents describe this as an uncontroversial exercise of 
Congress’s prerogative to distribute federal largess in any way that it feels 
is rationally related to the general welfare.190 No unconstitutional impact is 
made on speech, the argument goes, because CIPA does not require 
schools and libraries to apply Internet filters to its computers but merely 
conditions the receipt of federal funds on the acceptance of that 
condition.191 Any school or library that finds this condition coercive is free 
to reject it, understanding of course that this decision will come at a 
cost.192 Even after refusing to filter and losing the funds made contingent 
by CIPA, schools and libraries need only change their minds and apply 
Internet filters to become eligible, again, to apply for those funds.193 Using 
this approach, the government argues that CIPA’s specific purpose is 
merely an exercise of its administrative prerogative—in this case, assuring 
that federal funds supplied for library and school technology are not used 
to facilitate access to online materials that have no connection to those 
institutions’ educational missions.194 It is clear, however, that as long as 
 
 
 189. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain) 
(“When a school or library accepts federal dollars through the Universal Service fund, they become a 
partner with the federal government in pursuing the compelling interest of protecting children.”). 
 190. Typical is the view of CIPA proponent Rep. Chip Pickering who, in a prepared statement to a 
House subcommittee reviewing the E-rate and filtering, concluded that: 
CIPA is constitutional because the conditions imposed on public libraries for receiving 
federal funds for Internet access are ‘reasonably calculated to promote the general welfare’ 
and are ‘related to a national concern.’ Congress has the authority and responsibility to ensure 
that federal funds are not used by government agencies (public schools and libraries) to 
provide access to pornography that is illegal under federal law . . . . 
See E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children’s Internet Protection Act: Hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (prepared statement of Rep. Chip Pickering). 
 191. See discussion of use of conditional subsidies, infra Part IV. 
 192. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(I)-(ii). 
 193. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) states in pertinent part: 
A school that has failed to comply with a certification . . . may remedy the failure by ensuring 
the use of its computers in accordance with such certification. Upon submittal . . . of such 
remedy, the school shall be eligible for services at discount rates . . . . 
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(iii)(II). 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(F)(iii)(II) reads identically but is applied to 
libraries. 
 194. CIPA’s most zealous legislative sponsors seem oblivious to the possibility that withholding 
federal technology funds from schools and libraries that refuse to filter Internet content could cause 
constitutional problems. See, e.g., E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of Rep. Charles W. Pickering), 
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-33.pdf. 
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the federal funds subject to sequester are sufficiently important to libraries 
and schools to ensure that most will be compelled to accede to CIPA’s 
filtering prerequisite, Congress gains, as a secondary effect of its 
conditional funding decision, much of the broad Internet content control 
that it had tried and failed to achieve with the passage of the CDA and 
COPA. 
IV. CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
A. Restrictions on the Spending Power 
In order to avoid the strict First Amendment scrutiny that proved fatal 
for the CDA and has rendered COPA unenforceable, the government must 
prevail in characterizing CIPA as a permissible exercise of its spending 
power rather than a direct regulation of speech. However, this 
characterization relies on a highly selective application of legal principles 
developed over the last seventy years that appear to give Congress virtual 
carte blanche to control the activities of federal fund recipients. 
Government confidence that spending power decisions will receive 
judicial deference may be unfounded, particularly when funding 
conditions compromise First Amendment rights.  
Congress has at its disposal billions of dollars each year to fund various 
federal and state programs that it adjudges to be in the interest of the 
“general welfare.”195 It is safe to say that almost all of these funds come 
with some strings attached. Recipients typically have no constitutional 
claim to these funds; rather, the Constitution’s Spending Clause196 
provides Congress with largely unfettered discretion, to which the courts 
                                                                                                                         
 
[T]his [CIPA] is a common-sense mainstream constitutional way to protect our children from 
child predators, from obscenity, from child pornography, that which is already illegal. We 
believe that the language and the legislation was very well crafted, taking lessons from recent 
communications efforts to restrict this type of material, but that was unsuccessfully ruled 
against—or it was ruled that it was unconstitutional in the courts. We believe that we avoided 
those pitfalls and those problems by the way that we crafted the language. This is an issue of 
funding, and it is an issue of child safety. And just as we give incentives to have alcohol 
blood limits or seat belt restraints for safety of the public, we believe for the safety of our 
children as well as preventing that which is illegal, child pornography and obscenity, and 
having access through our schools and through our libraries with federal subsidies. And we 
believe that this is a very mainstream, common-sense approach, and that the agenda of the 
other side who opposes is out of the mainstream. It is extreme. It would put our children at 
risk. 
Id. 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
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typically defer, to define how public funds can best be used to promote the 
general welfare.197 Recognizing that this judicial deference to federal 
spending decisions can provide a path of least resistance in troublesome 
regulatory matters, Congress, during the last half of the twentieth century, 
increasingly relied upon its power to place conditions upon the distribution 
of federal largess.198 In fact, regulation through its spending power has 
become one of the primary tools Congress uses to control the activities of 
prospective funding recipients in ways that conform to its vision of 
contemporary federal policy because this frequently avoids many of the 
troublesome constitutional barriers that would make such control 
problematic, if not impossible, if they were attempted as direct statutory 
mandates.199 
In describing CIPA as a routine use of broad spending powers granted 
to Congress under the Spending Clause, the government relied upon a 
series of Supreme Court decisions begun in the 1920s and developed 
during the 1930s that appear to provide ample justification for the view 
that Congress’s ability to place conditions on the distribution of federal 
 
 
 197. That judgment has specifically been ruled to be a matter of congressional, not judicial, 
discretion. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the 
Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90-92 (2001) (“The Court [has] held that Congress has broad 
power to tax and spend for the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional 
provisions.”); Georges Nahitchevansky, Note, Free Speech and Government Funding: Does the 
Government Have to Fund What it Doesn’t Like? 56 BROOK. L. REV. 213, 219 (1990) (“Because there 
is no entitlement to public funds, the government is generally free to determine how it should allocate 
its subsidies.”). 
 198. See Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to Circumvent City of Boerne v. 
Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in its Unconstitutional Conditions 
Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469 (2000) (“Congress's power to condition its discretionary 
allocations of funds is remarkably broad . . . . Because of this historical trend, the spending power has 
been invoked repeatedly in recent years as the clearest, and perhaps only, tool with which Congress 
might circumvent the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to enforce federalism-based constitutional 
norms.”). 
 199. After more than fifty years of increasingly broad interpretations of the congressional 
spending power, the 1990s witnessed what some commentators have called a “new federalism” in 
which courts signaled a willingness to alter or abandon the Butler and Dole line of wide-open 
deference to congressional spending decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 
(1995) (quoting James Madison, who said that “[t]he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite.”). See also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1920 (1995) (“So long as the Commerce Clause is not interpreted to grant 
Congress plenary power to regulate the states directly, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the 
states of all powers not delegated to the federal government has content and significance.”). But see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 197, at 96-104 (arguing against using the Tenth Amendment to limit 
congressional spending power). 
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funds is virtually unlimited and immune from judicial challenge.200 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Spending Clause gives 
Congress an independent grant of legislative authority distinct from that 
which is specifically enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution.201 The spending power has been interpreted to be an 
independent legislative authority202 that allows Congress to “further broad 
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.”203 
Despite the seemingly unlimited reach of the power afforded to 
Congress in making spending decisions, a number of purported limitations 
on this power have emerged from the body of Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting its use. The contemporary opinion that most comprehensively 
summarizes the Court’s modern view of the parameters of Congress’s 
spending power is South Dakota v. Dole.204 Despite Dole’s establishment 
of a set of possible limitations on Congress’s spending power, these 
limitations, as applied by the courts over the last sixty-five years, have 
proven to be more theoretical than real.  
In Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal statute authorizing the 
Secretary of Transportation to withhold highway funds from states that 
refused to raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one, ostensibly to 
 
 
 200. See Baker, supra note 199, at 1924-31 (reviewing the line of opinions between 1923 and 
1993 in which the Supreme Court uniformly deferred to Congress’s authority and discretion to place 
conditions on the distribution of federal funds). 
 201. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 65). 
 202. The first Supreme Court case to state this proposition, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 
(1936), has been cited regularly in support of the concept that “the power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative 
power found in the Constitution.” Id. at 66. See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) 
(holding that Congress, and not the courts, has discretion to determine what constitutes the “general 
welfare”); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (reaffirming that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s 
‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and 
the conditional grant of federal funds”) (citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66). 
 203. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 
(1974) (“The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the 
States shall be disbursed.”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (stating 
that the constitutionality of the federal government imposing “reasonable conditions on the use of 
federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges” is “beyond challenge”); Oklahoma v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947) (“The offer of benefits to a state by the United States 
dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not 
unusual.”); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 612 (1937) (finding no encroachment on state 
authority when conditions are placed on federal aid “which the state, without surrendering any of its 
powers may accept or not as it chooses”). 
 204. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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promote Congress’s interest in “safe interstate travel.”205 Although the 
Court upheld the statute as a “valid use of the spending power,”206 it made 
clear that Congress’s spending power is “not unlimited.”207 The Court 
identified four restrictions on use of the spending power.208  
The first general restriction comes from the language of the Spending 
Clause itself, which states that Congress may use its spending power to 
provide for “the general welfare” of the United States.209 In considering 
the definition of that phrase, the Court has chosen to interpret it broadly,210 
deferring almost entirely to Congress’s judgment and discretion in 
determining when a particular spending decision appropriately supports 
the “general welfare.”211 The Court has said that it is not proper for the 
judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of Congress in making this 
determination unless the choice made is “clearly wrong, a display of 
arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise of judgment.”212 Although the cases 
do not define these terms with specificity, the Court has stated that the 
burden rests with the party claiming that Congress has abused its spending 
power to show that “by no reasonable possibility can the challenged 
legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the 
Congress.”213 In Dole, the Court ruled that Congress had surmounted the 
“general welfare” restriction simply by declaring drinking drivers under 
the age of twenty-one to be a “dangerous situation” in need of a “national 
solution.”214  
The second general restriction discussed in Dole requires that, when 
 
 
 205. Id. at 208. 
 206. Id. at 212. 
 207. Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 
(1981)). 
 208. Id. at 207-08. 
 209. Id. at 207 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)). 
 210. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66. In Butler, the Court analyzed the competing interpretations 
ascribed to the phrase “to provide for the general welfare of the United States” by founding fathers 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. As between Madison’s view that the phrase was confined to 
the powers directly granted to Congress in Article I and Hamilton’s view that the clause conferred 
upon Congress powers independent of those specifically enumerated, the Butler court held that 
Hamilton’s is the “true construction” of the phrase. Id. at 66. 
 211. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41). 
 212. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640. 
 213. Id. at 641 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 67). 
 214. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. The Court took recognition of a Presidential Commission report of 
which, ostensibly, Congress was aware when passing the legislation in question; the report supports 
the view that the lack of uniform drinking ages among the states creates an incentive to drink and drive 
in states where drinking age is lower. Id. at 209. Regardless of one’s intuitive agreement or 
disagreement with that general finding, it can hardly be said that the Court required Congress to 
provide anything beyond the barest justification that the purpose of the conditional funding statute was 
within the nation’s general welfare. 
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Congress places conditions on funding, it must do so “unambiguously” so 
that recipients may “exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the 
consequences of their participation.”215 This is because legislation 
invoking Congress’s spending power is “much in the nature of a 
contract”216 and is only legitimate when the recipient “voluntarily and 
knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”217 This requirement was 
met in Dole, where states that permitted those under age twenty-one to 
drink could not receive federal highway funds. The Court found that “[t]he 
conditions upon which States receive the funds . . . could not be more 
clearly stated by Congress.”218  
Dole’s third restriction on funding conditions requires that the 
restrictions relate “to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs.”219 Because South Dakota did not challenge Congress’s 
argument that the conditions it had placed on highway funds were directly 
related to concerns about safe interstate travel, the Court found no reason 
to declare that these conditions had run afoul of the germaneness 
restriction.220 
As its fourth general restriction, the Dole Court observed that “other 
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the 
conditional grant of federal funds.”221 South Dakota argued that this 
restriction should apply on the theory that the Twenty-first Amendment 
prohibited a direct mandate of a national minimum drinking age and that 
any use by Congress of its spending power to achieve that end indirectly 
would be equally barred.222 The Court stated that this restriction in no way 
 
 
 215. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 216. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
 217. Id. (“There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions 
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”). 
 218. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
 219. Id. at 207-08 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 220. Id. at 208. But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (holding that “the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”). In 
Dolan, the Court required an “essential nexus” between protected speech and the imposed restriction. 
Id. at 386. See also Angel D. Mitchell, Comment, Conditional Federal Funding to the States: The New 
Federalism Demands a Close Examination for Unconstitutional Conditions, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 161, 
176-77 (1999) (observing that since the late 1980s, the Court has “indulged in a more meaningful 
germaneness inquiry for unconstitutional conditions under the Takings Clause”). 
 221. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 
269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
333 n.34 (1968)). 
 222. Id. at 209-10. 
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limited the general proposition that Congress can use its spending power 
to achieve policy objectives that it could not achieve through direct 
statutory mandates; rather, it simply bars Congress from using that power 
“to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”223 The Court ruled that although the Twenty-first 
Amendment prohibits Congress from mandating a national minimum 
drinking age, there is no constitutional bar against using “blandishments 
offered by Congress”224 to induce a state to raise its own minimum 
drinking age to twenty-one.225 
Dole also recognized that excessive coercion could affect the 
permissibility of federal spending conditions.226 For as long as the Court 
has reviewed challenges of the congressional spending power, it has 
recognized the potential for federal economic pressure on both the states 
and individual funding recipients that “pass[es] the point at which 
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”227 In United States v. Butler, the Court’s 
earliest examination of this subject, it spoke of “[t]he power to confer or 
withhold unlimited benefits [as] the power to coerce or destroy”228 and 
suggested that economic pressure can become so extreme that the 
supposed choice offered to funding recipients is, in fact, illusory.229 In the 
case of conditional funding offers to the states, the Court has suggested 
that the line between permissible pressure and impermissible coercion is 
crossed where conditions offered effectively destroy or impair state 
autonomy to decide between accepting or declining.230  
 
 
 223. Id. at 210. As examples of spending conditions that would be barred under this restriction, 
the Court lists conditional funding offers that require states to engage in “invidiously discriminatory” 
actions or the “infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. 
 224. Id. at 211. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Although many courts 
pay “lip service” to the theory that excessive coercion could limit the use of Congress’s spending 
power, they have been unwilling to apply this theory in practice. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1428-42 (1989) (reviewing the “coercion 
debate” in cases). 
 228. 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937). In both Butler and New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court found that the federal government’s conditional offers 
encroached on powers reserved for the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Each Court, 
however, arrived at that result from different perspectives. In Butler, the Court held that the 
government’s attempt to regulate local agricultural production simply was not within any express or 
implied power of the federal government. In New York a federal condition requiring the state to “take 
title” to, and responsibility for, damages from low-level radioactive waste ran afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment, as well, not because the federal government had encroached on reserved powers of the 
states, but because the funding “options” presented “[a] choice between two constitutionally coercive 
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B. Conditional Funding in the First Amendment Context 
Although the courts have displayed an almost pristine record of 
deference to Congress concerning the conditions placed on recipients of 
federal funds in most contexts,231 the judiciary has been far less reluctant 
to examine critically congressional attempts to implement funding 
conditions affecting First Amendment rights. Freedom of speech is one of 
our most cherished fundamental rights, and the First Amendment is 
designed to ensure that no laws are made that will directly interfere with 
that right. Nevertheless, the First Amendment itself places no affirmative 
obligation on the federal government to fund speech. To say that the 
government may not directly impinge on a citizen’s right of free speech is 
not to say that the state has the obligation to fund the exercise of speech-
related activity.232 Certainly, “[r]efusing to fund speech . . . is not identical 
to prohibiting it.”233 As discussed in the previous section, Congress’s 
distribution of federal funds is discretionary; no one is entitled, by right, to 
receive a government subsidy to facilitate her First Amendment 
expressions.234 
Frequently, however, Congress does subsidize speech that either 
conveys the government’s own message or facilitates private, 
nongovernmental expression. While, as with other decisions concerning 
federal spending, Congress has broad discretion to decide what speech it 
will subsidize and under what conditions, the fundamental nature of First 
Amendment rights and the possibility that conditional funding discretion 
                                                                                                                         
 
regulatory techniques,” each beyond the authority of Congress. 505 U.S. at 176. The Court held that by 
presenting the state with no alternative but to follow one of two federal regulatory paths, “the Act 
commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program.” 505 U.S. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). But see Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (holding that the Tenth 
Amendment’s limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs does not concomitantly limit the 
range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants). 
 231. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of 
Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 182 (2002) (questioning why, in the light of Dole, 
the courts have been so reluctant to apply these restrictions “to [limit] Congress’s ability to effect 
policy . . . .”). The author goes on to state that judicial deference for federal spending conditions has 
been so complete that the courts impose no “meaningful limitations” on Congress’s spending power. 
Id.  
 232. The government is under no obligation to subsidize speech rights. See Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (citing Cammarano v. United States, 
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that Congress is not obligated to subsidize lobbying)). 
 233. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 681 (1992). 
 234. See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (“We again reject the ‘notion that First Amendment rights 
are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.’”) (quoting Cammarano v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959)). 
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could be abused to effect government viewpoint censorship on expression 
has led the Supreme Court to consider the parameters of Congress’s 
spending power when funding of speech is involved.235 Because the line 
between legitimate government discretion and impermissible viewpoint 
restriction is not easily discerned,236 Supreme Court consideration of 
particular funding challenges has been contradictory and confused. 
1. Constitutional Parameters on Conditional Funding of Speech 
Between June 1958 and February 1959, the Supreme Court embarked 
on two lines of decisions that have since been applied to challenges of 
governmental conditions on funding of speech and other fundamental 
rights. The first line of cases, initiated with the Court’s holding in Speiser 
v. Randall,237 applies the venerable doctrine of “unconstitutional 
conditions” to strike down funding conditions that require beneficiaries to 
forego “preferred constitutional rights”238 with which the government 
could not directly interfere. The second line of cases, begun just eight 
months after Speiser with the Court’s opinion in Cammarano v. United 
States,239 has been applied to uphold funding conditions in which the 
Court supported the government’s discretion to restrict activities, even if 
constitutionally protected, that it has chosen not to subsidize.  
Because these doctrines will likely be considered in a future Supreme 
Court review of CIPA’s constitutionality, a brief analysis of the Court’s 
development of each is essential to gain some perspective on the 
philosophical conflicts and doctrinal complexity that the Court will face.240 
Inherent in this analysis is a tension between the deference typically 
 
 
 235. “[T]he more narrow the range of speech that the government chooses to subsidize (whether 
directly, through government grants or other funding, or indirectly, through the creation of a public 
forum) the more deference the First Amendment accords the government in drawing content-based 
distinctions.” Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 458. Conversely, the Court has 
said “[t]he more broadly the government facilitates private speech, however, the less deference the 
First Amendment accords to the government’s content-based restrictions on the speech that it 
facilitates.” Id. at 460. 
 236. Nahitchevansky, supra note 197, at 224. 
 237. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 238. Sullivan, supra note 227. 
Not all constitutional rights are implicated in unconstitutional conditions cases. By its very 
nature, the doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of exercise of 
autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech, exercise of religion 
or privacy, corporate rights to do interstate business or invoke federal diversity jurisdiction, or 
state rights to self-government. 
Id. at 1426. 
 239. 358 U.S. 498 (1959). 
 240. See generally Baker, supra note 199; Cole, supra note 233; Sullivan, supra note 227. 
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afforded Congress when making routine benefit allocations and the strict 
constitutional scrutiny that the courts have applied when Congress attaches 
conditions to those benefits that impinge on fundamental constitutional 
rights.241 Whereas the Court has traditionally reviewed government 
spending decisions with great deference, statutes that unconstitutionally 
condition the receipt of federal benefits on the relinquishment of a 
fundamental right are typically subjected to strict scrutiny.  
In Speiser, the Court struck down a California constitutional provision 
requiring that World War II veterans submit a loyalty oath as a condition 
of eligibility for a state property tax exemption specifically limited to 
veterans.242 In striking down this law, the Court stated that the denial of a 
benefit based on claimants’ refusal to surrender their right of free speech 
effectively “penalize[s] them for such speech”243 and equated the deterrent 
effect of such a penalty to be “the same as if the State were to fine them 
for this speech.”244 The Court rejected California’s contention that the tax 
exemption in question was merely a “privilege” or a “bounty” that it could 
freely deny without First Amendment implications,245 describing the 
state’s primary motivation to be the impermissible suppression of 
unpopular or “dangerous” ideas.246 Although the state had no obligation to 
confer a tax exemption on veterans at all, the Court concluded that, once 
the exemption was established, the state could not coercively use its 
spending power to effect speech restrictions that “if directly attempted 
would be unconstitutional.”247  
More than a decade after its decision in Speiser, the Court virtually 
repeated that holding in Perry v. Sindermann.248 In Perry, the Court held 
that a state junior college teacher could not be denied renewal of his 
employment contract merely because he had publicly criticized the 
school’s administration.249 Again, as in Speiser, the Court held that while 
no one has a right to receive a government benefit, it is not permissible for 
the government to deny such benefits in a way that “infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of 
 
 
 241. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1422. 
 242. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528-29. 
 243. Id. at 518. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 519. 
 247. Id. at 518. 
 248. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 249. Id. at 598. 
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speech.”250 To do so would be to “penalize[] and inhibit[]”251a 
fundamental right and would “produce a result which [the government] 
could not command directly.”252 
Taken together, Speiser and Perry are textbook examples of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in its purest form. Under this doctrine, 
originated in the early 1900s in Lochner v. New York253 and frequently, if 
inconsistently, applied by courts and First Amendment scholars since then, 
the doctrine’s basic premise is that the “government may not condition 
benefits on the forfeiture of constitutional rights.”254 Used at its inception 
to protect economic liberties of “foreign corporations and private 
truckers,”255 the Supreme Court gradually shifted the doctrine’s focus to 
the protection of personal liberties and has applied it many times to 
invalidate governmental restrictions that made receipt of benefits 
conditional upon surrender of First Amendment rights.256 But, as a 
doctrine built on such subjective concepts as coercion and penalty, it has 
been inconsistently and, at times, inexplicably implemented.257 As applied 
in Speiser and Perry, the Court has at its disposal a tool that can be, and 
has been, used to invalidate government attempts to force recipients to 
surrender constitutional rights in return for government benefits.258 
However, within months of its holding in Speiser, the Court developed 
a competing approach in Cammarano v. United States,259 upholding the 
constitutionality of offers of conditional benefits that affect recipients’ 
constitutional rights. In Cammarano, the Court upheld Internal Revenue 
Service regulations that denied tax deductions for expenditures associated 
with political lobbying.260 The regulations were challenged on First 
Amendment grounds by individuals who claimed that the deductions had 
been unconstitutionally conditioned on their willingness to surrender their 
right to engage in political speech in direct conflict with the doctrine 
espoused in Speiser.261 In a neat bit of conceptual legerdemain, the Court 
 
 
 250. Id. at 597. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526). 
 253. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 254. Cole, supra note 233, at 679. 
 255. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1416. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 1434-36. 
 258. See generally Mitchell, supra note 220, at 172-76 (providing a detailed discussion of the 
coercion, penalty, and nonsubsidy theories emerging from Speiser, Perry, and related opinions). 
 259. 358 U.S. 498 (1959). 
 260. Id. at 513. 
 261. Id. at 512-13. 
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distinguished the two cases, ruling that the claimants in Cammarano were 
denied a tax exemption not because they refused to surrender their 
protected lobbying activities, but because the government had simply 
decided that they should bear the cost of those activities themselves.262 
Because the regulations applied this denial of benefits to everyone in a 
nondiscriminatory way, were not “aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas,”263 and did not extinguish all avenues for the claimants to exercise 
their constitutionally protected activity (albeit, not at government 
expense), the Court was unwilling to disrupt Congress’s discretionary 
decision not to subsidize political lobbying with tax benefits.264 
The Court subsequently extended its holding in Cammarano to 
protected constitutional rights in Maher v. Roe265 and Harris v. McRae.266 
At issue in each case were Medicaid policies that called for coverage of 
medical expenses related to childbirth, but excluded similar expenses 
related to abortion.267 Clarifying a key point in Cammarano, the Court 
held that the unconstitutional conditions challenges to the policies in 
question were inappropriate because the government had not totally 
foreclosed the claimants’ rights to abortions on their own time and with 
their own funds.268 The policies in question merely defined the scope of 
the benefit and did not attempt to proscribe abortions outside the Medicaid 
program; the Court concluded that the government was under no 
obligation to subsidize activity that it did not favor.269 Because there is no 
 
 
 262. Id. at 513 (“Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in 
constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities entirely 
out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do under the . . . 
Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 263. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (quoting American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). 
 264. See Amy E. Moody, Comment, Conditional Federal Grants: Can the Government Undercut 
Lobbying by Nonprofits Through Conditions Placed on Federal Grants?, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 113, 129 (1996). 
 265. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 266. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 267. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 464 (1977) (reviewing a three-judge district court holding that “the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic 
abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to 
pregnancy and childbirth”); Harris, 448 U.S. at 303 (1980) (alleging that a federal Medicaid rule 
limiting the funding of abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother while permitting the 
funding of costs associated with childbirth violates affected claimants’ First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendment rights). 
 268. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (“The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles absolute or 
otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”); Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-18 (holding that 
there is “no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy”). 
 269. Id. The Court in Maher spoke of the latitude given the state in its use of spending to 
encourage particular activities: 
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affirmative duty for the government to fund even fundamental rights, a 
refusal to subsidize those rights does not effect an unconstitutional 
condition on those who are refused federal benefits.270 
Having set the foundation for its unconstitutional conditions and 
nonsubsidy lines of conditional benefit analyses, the Court continued to 
refine each over the next two decades, often drawing inexplicably fine 
distinctions in choosing the application of one doctrine over the other in 
strikingly similar scenarios. Typically, the Court’s choice depends upon its 
characterization of how coercion imposed by the government ultimately 
affects funding recipients’ ability to engage in constitutionally protected 
activities.271 In cases where the Court concludes that funding conditions 
are so coercive that they leave recipients with no choice but to forego 
constitutionally protected activity, the Court is able to declare this 
condition to be a penalty and invoke the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to reject it.272 Invoking unconstitutional conditions subjects the 
challenged funding conditions to strict scrutiny and obliges the 
government to justify its actions against the most rigorous standard of 
constitutional review.273 In contrast, when the Court finds that a funding 
condition merely structures a program to support federally encouraged 
activities without precluding recipients’ exercise of constitutionally 
protected activity on their own time and with their own money, the Court 
can uphold the challenged conditions as a mere nonsubsidy.274 A 
characterization of a condition as a nonsubsidy requires only that it be 
shown to be “rationally related” to government’s interests to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.275 It appears that the Court has given itself two 
                                                                                                                         
 
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional 
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State’s 
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
432 U.S. at 475-76. See also Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (“[I]t simply does not follow that a woman’s 
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself 
of the full range of protected choices.”). 
 270. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18. 
 271. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1434-36. 
 272. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denying welfare benefits to residents 
residing in a state for less than one year penalizes the fundamental right of interstate travel); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (ruling that a condition on receipt of unemployment benefits tied to an 
agreement to choose between work and religious observance has the effect of coercing the recipient to 
refrain from protected speech); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a state 
requirement that conditioned World War II veterans’ receipt of veterans’ property tax exemptions on 
taking a loyalty oath). 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 237-58. 
 274. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1439 (“‘Penalties’ coerce; ‘nonsubsidies’ do not.”). 
 275. Having developed a theory allowing it to apply strict scrutiny to funding conditions viewed 
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result-oriented doctrines to call upon to resolve challenges to conditional 
benefit cases as it sees fit.276 The Court’s method of analysis has led 
commentators to conclude simply that “[i]f the Court wishes to strike 
down a condition, it declares it to be an unconstitutional condition; if the 
Court wishes to uphold a condition, it declares that the government is 
making a permissible choice to subsidize some activities and not 
others.”277  
The impending Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of CIPA 
is likely to depend, in part, on which of these competing doctrines the 
Court chooses to apply to this statute. If CIPA’s challengers are able to 
convince the Court that the Act’s requirement that public libraries install 
software filters on their Internet-accessible computers coerces them to 
choose between sacrificing First Amendment rights and accepting much 
needed technology funds, the challengers will have opened a line of First 
Amendment attack that would require CIPA to withstand strict scrutiny 
analysis. If, however, the government is able to convince the Court that it 
is not obligated to subsidize unrestricted access to the Internet in public 
libraries but, rather, is free to condition library technology funding to 
discourage access to particular kinds of speech with government funds, 
                                                                                                                         
 
as coercing recipients into foregoing fundamental constitutional rights, the Court soon developed a 
counterbalancing theory that allowed it to provide greater constitutional deference in cases where it did 
not view Congress’s funding conditions as coercion or penalties. For an extensive discussion of the 
Court’s nonsubsidy analysis, see generally Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as 
“Nonsubsidies”: When Is Deference Inappropriate? 80 GEO. L.J. 131 (1991). 
When taking the nonsubsidy view, the Court argues that differential subsidies affecting rights 
are allocative choices made by a government with virtually no affirmative responsibilities. 
The subsidies need only pass the test of minimum rationality applicable to classifications that 
do not affect constitutional rights. Thus, the court begins from the assumption that the benefit 
scheme is constitutional, and demands that beneficiaries show why the scheme cannot pass 
the test. 
Id. at 148. 
 276. A number of commentators have noted that the Court’s categorization of a particular funding 
condition as either coercion/penalty or a mere nonsubsidy depends, almost entirely, on whether it 
wants the result of its opinion to strike those conditions or uphold them. See Sullivan, supra note 227, 
at 1420 (“Conclusory labels often take the place of analysis—for example, conditioned benefits are 
frequently deemed ‘penalties’ when struck down and ‘nonsubsidies’ when upheld.”). See also Michael 
W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
989, 992 (1991) (observing that the Court tends “to approach the problem of selective funding by 
reasoning backward from a desired result”); Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley: Sinking Deeper Into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s Unintelligible Modern 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REV. 225, 250-51 (“[The Court’s] unconstitutional 
conditions decisions now amount to judicial policymaking, with the Court seemingly reaching 
decisions through a results oriented approach rather than through the application of a cognizable 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”). 
 277. Mitchell, supra note 220, at 173 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 11.2.4.4 at 795 (1997)). 
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CIPA will be subjected to a greatly reduced standard of constitutional 
analysis and is likely to be upheld. Although the choice remains elusive, 
particularly after American Library Association v. United States,278 a close 
examination of the latest unconstitutional conditions and nonsubsidy cases 
suggests both that the government has read the Supreme Court’s 
nonsubsidy cases too broadly and that the selective subsidization of speech 
in public libraries violates the First Amendment.  
2. Rust v. Sullivan and the Nonsubsidy Doctrine in Ascendancy  
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court authored its most comprehensive 
endorsement to date of the government’s broad powers of choice in 
deciding what speech to subsidize with federal funds.279 The Court upheld 
Health and Human Services regulations that restricted family planning 
clinics funded under Title X of the Public Health Services Act280 from 
counseling clients about abortion281 while placing no restrictions on other 
forms of family planning, including anti-abortion advocacy.282 The 
plaintiffs claimed that placing conditions on Title X benefits that require 
recipients to forego constitutionally protected speech about abortion 
imposed an unconstitutional condition upon those funds.283 The Court 
ruled, however, based upon an expansive interpretation of its nonsubsidy 
line of cases, that the conditions did not exceed the parameters of the 
government-funded program itself and in no way restricted fund recipients 
or their clients from either providing or seeking abortion counseling 
outside the auspices of the Title X-funded program.284  
Drawing upon and extending earlier nonsubsidy decisions,285 the Court 
concluded that the government is allowed to make value judgments and 
state preferences to encourage activities that it feels are in the public 
interest within the confines of programs that it funds.286 Stating 
preferences does not effect viewpoint discrimination but merely represents 
a choice “to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”287 The mere 
 
 
 278. See supra note 17. 
 279. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 280. 42 U.S.C §§ 300-300a-6 (1994). 
 281. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80. 
 282. Id. at 192. 
 283. Id. at 196. 
 284. Id. at 198-99. 
 285. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983); 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 598, 513 (1959). 
 286. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 287. Id. 
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refusal to fund a protected activity does not impose the type of penalty on 
that activity sufficient to trigger the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.288 
The Court’s ruling in Rust was seen by many as providing the 
government carte blanche to place speech content restrictions within the 
confines of federally funded programs.289 Characterizing the government 
as the “financier” of such speech, then Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr 
opined that the government could “take sides” and “have viewpoints” 
when making funding decisions in the wake of Rust.290 Still others felt that 
a logical extension of the holding in Rust would classify any government-
funded speech to be speech by the government itself, which the 
government could control as it saw fit.291 At its most extreme, this 
approach led the Court, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,292 to 
validate a statute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to ensure 
that “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and 
values of the American public” are taken into consideration when 
reviewing grant applications.293 Although the majority opinion in Finley 
glossed over the disturbing breadth of this quintessentially viewpoint-
specific standard by stating there is no “realistic danger” that First 
Amendment rights will be compromised,294 Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
showed less reluctance to admit that the statute “unquestionably 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”295 Justice Scalia, however, agreed 
with the Court that it remains perfectly constitutional as a valid 
“congressional determination to favor decency and respect for beliefs and 
values over the opposite . . . .”296  
It is upon this most expansive interpretation of Rust that the 
government now relies in defending the constitutionality of CIPA.297 From 
its perspective, restrictions on Internet content in public libraries accepting 
federal funds are constitutional because the government has the discretion 
 
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Cole, supra note 233, at 676-77. 
 290. Id. at 676 (citing Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Advice Ban Upheld for Federally Funded Clinics, 
WASH. POST, May 24, 1991, at A1, A18).  
 291. Id. (citing Hearings on Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991) (statement of Leslie H. 
Southwick, Asst. Att’y Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t. of Justice)). 
 292. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 293. Id. at 572. 
 294. Id. at 583. 
 295. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 296. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 297. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). 
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to make choices about the type of activities to which it wants to “allocate 
scarce resources.”298 Additionally, by virtue of choosing to subsidize 
programs that feature speech, those who would rely on Rust believe that 
the government, either directly or through private entities enlisted to 
convey a governmental message, is in fact “the speaker” and thus is 
allowed to make content-based decisions regarding the speech that it 
funds.299 Under this line of reasoning, there can be no unconstitutional 
condition applied by CIPA’s filtering requirement because it does not 
preclude recipients “from engaging in protected conduct outside the scope 
of the federally funded program.”300 Recipients can choose to accept or 
reject the subsidy as they see fit. 
Following this reasoning, the Court turned its own long-standing 
enmity toward government imposition of content-based restrictions on 
speech301 on its head and threatened to make a mockery of its bedrock 
principle that the government may not place restrictions on expression 
simply because it finds the ideas expressed to be offensive or 
disagreeable.302 With this most expansive reading of Rust, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine was eviscerated, and the likelihood 
that government funding conditions on speech content could be 
successfully challenged under traditional First Amendment strictures had 
virtually disappeared.  
The Court, however, has significantly qualified the power of the 
government to control speech content through several landmark 
discretionary funding decisions since Rust. If applied, the logic of these 
decisions assures that the government will be unable to hide behind the 
nonsubsidy doctrine to avoid examination of the First Amendment 
implications of the CIPA filtering requirement. Although the holding in 
Rust strongly supports broad governmental power to place conditions on 
the speech of those organizations and individuals that it subsidizes, the 
opinion’s extensive dicta anticipates several possible scenarios where the 
 
 
 298. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
 299. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
 300. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
 301. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116 (1991) (stating that government-imposed content restrictions on speech threaten to 
“effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. The First Amendment 
presumptively places this sort of discrimination beyond the power of the government”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 302. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech does not 
lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass other or coerce them into action.”); 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (“[T]he fact that society may find speech 
offensive is not sufficient reason for suppressing it.”). 
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Court would likely rule that such government controls are not permissible. 
Most important among those is the Court’s recognition that Rust-type 
control would not be appropriate when the government provides funds to 
encourage private, nongovernmental speech. 
Rust suggests that the Court understands that not all speech in publicly 
funded forums can be classified as government speech, stating that even 
when the government funds a program and allows fund recipients to speak 
outside the confines of the government-funded program, this is not 
“invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of 
expression.”303 The Court cited public forums as areas that have “been 
traditionally open to the public for expressive activity”304 or “expressly 
dedicated to speech activity,”305 and universities as “traditional sphere[s] 
of free expression . . . fundamental to the functioning of . . . society.”306 
The Court stated that both were examples of the type of government-
funded programs in which the withholding or manipulation of subsidies to 
control the content of speech would not be appropriate, even where fund 
recipients are free to express themselves outside the confines of the 
subsidized program.307  
3. Post-Rust Government Funding of Private Speech 
It took the Court only four years after Rust to consider the question of 
government funding of private speech on its own merits. In Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,308 the Court specifically 
recognized the difference in the level of government control that is 
permissible over private, as opposed to governmental, speech. In 
Rosenberger, the Court struck down a university policy that refused to 
fund student newspapers espousing a religious viewpoint despite 
providing funds for other student publications.309 The Court rejected the 
university’s arguments that it had the authority as a government-funded 
entity, under Rust, to decide how to “allocate scarce resources to 
accomplish its educational mission,”310 and that in doing so, “content-
 
 
 303. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199. 
 304. Id. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990); Hague v. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.)). 
 305. Id. (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 309. Id. at 837. 
 310. Id. at 832. 
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based funding decisions are both inevitable and lawful.”311 The Court held 
that “viewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper when the University 
does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but 
instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers.”312 With this holding, the Court specifically limited and clarified 
its holding in Rust, stating that the government is only permitted “to 
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”313 When, on 
the other hand, federal funds are disbursed to “encourage a diversity of 
views from private speakers,”314 even in limited public forum[s] of the 
government’s own making,315 viewpoint-based restrictions are 
constitutionally impermissible.316 With this holding, the Court returned to 
its classic First Amendment principles that strenuously protect private 
speech from governmental viewpoint restrictions. 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,317 the Court further limited 
Rust’s application to cases in which the government finances private 
speech. Here, the Court struck down a law that restricted attorneys 
employed by the federally funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC) from 
challenging the validity of existing welfare law.318 Concluding that 
Congress had created the LSC specifically to assist clients in dealing with 
a wide range of legal needs,319 including all aspects of welfare law,320 the 
Court specifically stated that the factual setting of the LSC case was 
“distinguishable from Rust”321 based on its conclusion that the advice 
given by LSC attorneys to their clients “cannot be classified as 
governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the 
 
 
 311. Id. at 833. 
 312. Id. at 834. 
 313. Id. at 833. 
 314. Id. at 834. 
 315. Id. at 829. 
 316. Id. at 834. Despite a five-four split based on differing views about the holding’s import as an 
endorsement under the Establishment Clause of direct funding for religious activities, all nine Justices 
agreed with the basic finding that a distinction exists between government speech and private speech. 
Id. at 893 n.11. 
 317. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 318. Id. at 549. 
 319. Id. at 536 (“LSC’s mission is to distribute funds appropriated by Congress . . . ‘for the 
purpose of providing . . . legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially 
unable to afford legal assistance.’”) (quoting the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2996b(a)). 
 320. Id. at 542 (“The Government has designed this program to use the legal profession and the 
established Judiciary of the United States and the Federal Government to accomplish its end of 
assisting welfare claimants in determination or receipt of their welfare benefits.”). 
 321. Id. at 543. 
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concept.”322 The Court in Velazquez went further than Rosenberger in 
making its point about the consequences of the government using its funds 
to establish a forum for private speech. Drawing on its decision in FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of California,323 the Velazquez Court stated that 
when the government used a particular medium or forum to control private 
expression, “[t]he First Amendment forbade the Government from using 
the forum in an unconventional way to suppress speech inherent in the 
nature of the medium.”324 The Court reasoned that restricting attorneys 
from representing clients on particular issues found objectionable to the 
government “distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of . . . 
attorneys.”325  
The importance of these holdings cannot be overstated when assessing 
the constitutional challenge of CIPA. The federal courts have classified 
libraries as “limited public forums.”326 Further, courts have recognized that 
libraries serve as the “quintessential locus of the receipt of information.”327 
 
 
 322. Id. at 542-43. 
 323. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down a provision of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that 
prohibited “editorializing” by any noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving funds 
from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting). Id. at 402. The Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the prohibition reflected a proper exercise by Congress of its spending power, as a 
determination not to subsidize public broadcasting editorials, pointing out that the statute did not 
permit a station to use other funds to carry on this activity, and thus completely foreclosed this type of 
speech to any station receiving the public funds.) Id. at 399-400. 
 324. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (summarizing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 
at 396-97). 
 325. Id. at 544. Justice Scalia strongly criticized the majority for its forum “distortion” analysis, 
stating that it is “wrong on the law because there is utterly no precedent for the novel and facially 
implausible proposition that the First Amendment has anything to do with government funding that—
though it does not abridge anyone’s speech—distorts an existing medium of expression.” Id. at 555 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 326. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Library, 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 
2001) (“The parties correctly assert that a public library is a limited public forum for purposes of 
constitutional analysis.”); Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 548 (N.D. Tex. 2000) 
(“In a limited public forum, the government’s ability to restrict patrons’ First Amendment rights is 
extremely narrow.”); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 
2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that because a public library is a limited public forum designed 
for the “receipt and communication of information,” any policy that “limits the receipt and 
communication of information through the Internet based on the content of that information, . . . is 
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis . . . .”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 
958 F.2d 1242, 1262 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]s a limited public forum, the Library is obligated only to 
permit the public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature of the Library and consistent 
with the government’s intent in designating the Library as a public forum.”). 
 327. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255. See also Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
401, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that “the purpose of a public library in general, and the provision of 
Internet access within a public library in particular, is ‘for use by the public . . . for expressive 
activity,’ namely, the dissemination and receipt by the public of a wide range of information”) 
(citations omitted)). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist has characterized libraries as “designed for 
freewheeling inquiry.”328 As such, libraries clearly have their place within 
the “traditional sphere[s] of free expression” where the Court has 
suggested that government subsidies must be administered with strict 
neutrality.329 Public libraries are not intended to deliver governmental 
messages;330 rather they serve as “mighty resource[s] in the free 
marketplace of ideas.”331 The fact that government E-rate and LSTA 
subsidies assist libraries in offering the boundless resources of the Internet 
supports, rather than contradicts, the argument that federal funds 
encourage access to diverse private speech, just as the Court concluded the 
government had done with its support of student newspapers in 
Rosenberger and legal services in Velazquez. 
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court must decide which of the 
divergent analytical paths it has developed to help resolve challenges to 
congressional spending conditions should apply to the CIPA restrictions 
on library funding. For CIPA to survive, it is crucial that the Court accept 
the position that the Act’s conditions on library funding fall within 
Congress’s broad spending power discretion and should be accorded full 
judicial deference. As a corollary, the government will attempt to deflect 
strict First Amendment scrutiny of CIPA by asking the Court to adopt the 
Rust/Finley position that Congress is free to apply spending conditions on 
libraries, as government funded entities, in order to make value judgments 
and choose among activities it seeks to encourage without violating 
individual First Amendment rights. If the government is successful in that 
effort, CIPA will be subjected to a greatly reduced level of constitutional 
scrutiny, requiring only that there be a minimally rational relationship 
between the perceived congressional objective (ostensibly to keep children 
from accessing harmful materials on the Internet) and the means chosen to 
achieve that objective (the application of software filters to public library 
 
 
 328. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 329. Kristine M. Cunnane, Note, Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1460 (1999) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 200). 
 330. Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public Libraries’ 
Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 220 (2000). 
Given the public library’s role as facilitator rather than channel for government speech, the 
government should not have the plenary control over the material it makes available to 
patrons of a public library in the same way that it may control fora in which the government 
seeks to communicate its own message.  
Id. at 220. 
 331. Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976) (“A library is 
a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas . . . specially dedicated to broad dissemination of 
ideas.”). 
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computers).  
As discussed in the next section, however, such a view totally 
mischaracterizes public libraries and fails to appreciate the manner in 
which their patrons use library collections and services to exercise their 
rights of private, nongovernmental speech. Because libraries show all 
indicia of limited public forums subsidized by the government for the 
express purpose of facilitating broad private expression, the Court must 
uphold the district court’s rejection of a standard that does not 
acknowledge the burden on constitutional rights imposed by the conditions 
placed on funds in this case. The Court should instead follow Rosenberger 
and Velazquez and subject the government’s restrictions on the content of 
speech in such forums to strict scrutiny. Under this standard of review, the 
Court will assess whether the funding restrictions applied to libraries are 
“necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.”332 To properly apply strict scrutiny to CIPA, the Court 
will necessarily have to examine the nature of public libraries, the 
character of Congress’s interests in applying the CIPA funding conditions, 
the efficacy of the Internet filtering technology to address Congress’s 
interests without offending the First Amendment, and the existence of 
more narrowly tailored and less restrictive alternatives for achieving 
Congress’s goals.  
V. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF CIPA’S FILTERING REQUIREMENT 
Two arguments can be made to support the government’s view that 
Internet filtering in a public library used to limit selected online speech 
raises no First Amendment issues that are subject to strict scrutiny. First, it 
can be argued that the use of Internet filtering software to restrict selected 
online content from being available within the library is no different from 
the decisions routinely made by librarians when deciding what materials to 
add to their print collections. Second, it can be argued that government 
funding of public libraries does not create a forum in which it has an 
obligation to subsidize the exercise of First Amendment rights.  
A. The Internet Filtering/Library Acquisitions Analogy  
One of the most important tasks for any library is using its finite 
financial resources to acquire books and other materials that both fit its 
 
 
 332. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey 
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
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educational and research mission and satisfy the intellectual needs of its 
users. The guiding principles of library collection development encourage 
librarians to “provide materials and information presenting all points of 
view,” and admonish them not to exclude materials “because of the origin, 
background, or views of those contributing to their creation.”333 However, 
financial practicality dictates that a library cannot own everything. 
Professional discretion must be applied when deciding what materials to 
add or not to add to any library’s collection. These decisions are based on 
a variety of criteria including cost, compatibility with the rest of the 
library’s collection, authority of the author, and reputation of the 
publisher.334 Most libraries are guided in this process by collection 
development policies that are developed by the individual institution to 
help define the types of materials that fit within its acquisitions profile.335 
Theoretically, every title a library adds to its collection has been reviewed 
by some member of the professional staff for consideration of its “fit” 
within the library’s collection plan.336 Implicit in this process is the 
understanding that, as with any process involving human judgments, 
librarians undoubtedly make subjective judgments about the content of 
available library materials when deciding whether to select an item for 
purchase. While it is certainly possible that such subjectivity could lead to 
the imposition of personal viewpoint discrimination, such a result is 
contrary to the library profession’s ethical standards and practices.337 
 
 
 333. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, available at http://www.ala. 
org/alaorg/oif/librarybillofrights.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 334. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (listing 
possible criteria for library selection decisions). 
 335. Id. at 421 (“Public libraries generally make material selection decisions and frame policies 
governing collection development at the local level . . . . In pursuing the goal of achieving a balanced 
collection . . . librarians generally have a fair amount of autonomy, but may also be guided by a 
library's collection development policy.”). 
 336. Id. at 463. Libraries regularly use third-party vendors to help them identify materials that fit a 
profile of each subscribing institution’s interests. Id. Pursuant to what are known as “approval plans,” 
the vendors do send libraries selected materials based on their collection development plans, but they 
do so on approval. Id. Libraries are still responsible for reviewing selections sent to them on approval 
and are free to return titles that they feel do not fit their collection needs. Id. As a result, the principle 
that a librarian should review each title that a library adds to its collection holds true even when 
approval plans are used. Id. 
 337. Although not all librarians are members of the American Library Association, that 
organization’s Library Bill of Rights, Code of Ethics, and Policy Manual provide the guiding 
principles at the foundation of Masters of Library Science candidates’ training and form the standards 
against which professional librarian conduct is measured. Each of these documents includes extensive 
guidelines admonishing library professionals against the exclusion of materials because of viewpoint 
or controversial content. See American Library Association, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, adopted as 
amended by the ALA Council, Jan. 23, 1980, available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/ 
librarybillofrights.pdf (“Materials should not be excluded because of origin, background, or views of 
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Regardless of the subjectivity involved in the library selection process, the 
courts have deferred to librarians’ expertise in this matter and have 
subjected these decisions only to rational basis First Amendment 
review.338 
In comparison, filtering advocates raise an interesting issue when they 
argue that a library’s decision to exclude Internet materials from its 
“online collection” using software filters is no different than the process of 
deciding what print materials not to buy for the library’s print collection. 
Contending that a public library’s Internet filtering decisions are 
ministerial and discretionary in the same manner that library acquisitions 
decisions are, the argument continues that neither of these decisions 
implicate First Amendment review so long as they are viewpoint 
neutral.339 The importance of this distinction in the eyes of filtering 
advocates lies in the Supreme Court’s troublesome plurality decision in 
Board of Education v. Pico,340 which held that local school board 
discretion was exceeded when its members ordered the removal from 
school libraries of books that they adjudged to be “anti-American, anti-
Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.”341 Certainly, the 
government “may not remove books from . . . library shelves simply 
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their 
removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion.’”342 However, the Court did not 
choose to expressly extend this same prohibition to a library’s acquisitions 
decisions, stating that “nothing in our decision . . . affects in any way the 
discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of 
                                                                                                                         
 
those contributing to their creation.”); American Library Association, Code of Ethics, adopted by the 
ALA Council, June 28, 1995, available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/codeofethics.pdf (“We 
[librarians] distinguish between our personal convictions and professional duties and do not allow our 
personal beliefs to interfere with fair representation of the aims of our institutions or the provision of 
access to their information resources.”); American Library Association, POLICY MANUAL, § 53.1.11, 
available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/policymanual/intellect.html (“Librarians have a professional 
responsibility to be inclusive, not exclusive, in collection development and in the provision of 
interlibrary loans. Access to all materials legally obtainable should be assured to the user and policies 
should not unjustly exclude materials even if offensive to the librarian or the user.”). 
 338. Id. at 462 (citing Bell, supra note 330, at 225). 
 339. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552, 
562 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 340. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 341. Id. at 857 (quoting a school board press release explaining its actions in removing books 
from school libraries). 
 342. Id. at 872 (quoting West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). See also 
Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment’s Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and 
School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2000).  
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their schools.”343 The Court went on to explain that its decision to restrict 
discriminatory book removals was necessary to prevent the “suppression 
of ideas,”344 but it seemed not to recognize the possibility that the same 
sort of viewpoint suppression could result from discriminatory book 
selection decisions.  
It is upon this logical disconnect that filtering proponents have landed 
with full force in search of a constitutional principle that exposes Internet 
filtering to reduced First Amendment scrutiny. Their argument is that, 
because the Pico Court limited its application of exacting constitutional 
standards to book removal decisions and chose not to address the 
constitutional implications of viewpoint-specific acquisitions decisions,345 
the Court’s silence on the issue justifies library viewpoint-neutral 
decisions concerning whether or not to acquire information content, be it 
books or Internet sites, without regard to First Amendment 
considerations.346 If filters are viewed as a software tool to help librarians 
make decisions about what Internet content to “acquire” for the library, 
they argue, why not view the entire process, including the use of Internet 
filters, as an acquisitions decision subject only to minimal constitutional 
scrutiny?  
This argument, however, assumes more about the theoretical 
inapplicability of Pico to library acquisitions decisions than the Court’s 
decision permits. While it is clear that the Pico plurality does place First 
Amendment limitations on the discretion of libraries to remove materials 
from their collections347 and specifically refuses to extend this principle to 
acquisitions decisions, it would be a mistake to read the Court’s silence on 
the constitutional implications of a library’s selective acquisition of library 
materials as precluding a court from doing so in the future. Nothing in the 
Pico decision precludes a court from going beyond the bounds of that 
holding to review a library’s decision not to add materials because they 
espouse a particular political, moral, or social orthodoxy. In fact, in his 
dissent to the Pico holding, now Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the 
logic of the Court’s distinction between selection and removal of 
materials, observing that “if ‘suppression of ideas’ is to be the talisman, 
one would think that a school board’s public announcement of its refusal 
 
 
 343. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (emphasis in original). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 871-72. 
 346. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 
(E.D. Va. 1998). 
 347. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71. The Court stated that this discretion “may not be exercised in a 
narrowly partisan or political manner.” Id. at 870. 
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to acquire certain books would have every bit as much impact on public 
attention as would an equally publicized decision to remove the books.”348 
By extending the Pico prohibition against viewpoint bias to acquisitions 
decisions as Rehnquist and commentators suggest,349 both selection and 
removal decisions would be subject to the same constitutional analysis and 
would result in identical First Amendment sanctions when viewpoint 
discrimination is found. Moreover, there is no logical reason that such 
review could not extend to a policy that blocks access to Internet sites on 
the same content-based rationale.350 
Although there is a logical purity to an extension of the Pico analysis to 
acquisitions decisions, regardless of whether the items being selected are 
in print or electronic format, this argument displays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the basic impediments to its practical application. 
Perhaps most daunting is the evidentiary problem of evaluating the 
subjective intent of librarians who choose not to purchase a book for a 
library collection. As Professor Richard J. Peltz noted: “[I]f officials’ 
intentions were dispositive, a court would be hard pressed to look inside 
the minds of librarians to determine why they acquired one book as 
opposed to another.”351 Although it is certainly true that removal decisions 
can be equally subjective, the actual removal of an item from a library’s 
collection is typically accompanied by some discoverable evidentiary trail, 
such as memoranda recommending removal, cataloging records, and 
withdrawal forms.352 In contrast, it is rare, indeed, for individual decisions 
not to buy an item for a library collection to be accompanied by any kind 
of traceable evidentiary trail. Although there is anecdotal evidence of long 
standing that some librarians make selection decisions based on 
 
 
 348. Id. at 916-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 349. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Use “The Filter You Were Born With:” The Unconstitutionality of 
Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REV. 397, 447 
(2002) (“Perhaps significantly, only three of the Justices then on the Court remain there today—
Stevens, O’Connor, and now-Chief Justice Rehnquist—and the political balance has drifted toward 
favoring the Pico dissenters.”). See also Nadel, supra note 342, at 1123 (“As a matter of principle . . . 
as Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Pico observed, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination 
should apply as strongly to library purchase decisions as it does to removals.”) (citing Pico, 457 U.S. 
at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
 350. This concept has, seemingly, never been tested judicially. See Nadel, supra note 342, at 
1123-24 (“[N]either Westlaw nor the ALA’s Office of Intellectual Freedom could recall any court 
decision that even considered a First Amendment challenge to a library’s decision not to purchase a 
book or to accept one as a donation.”). 
 351. Peltz, supra note 349, at 447. 
 352. See Nadel, supra note 342, at 1124 (“Removing a book from a library generally requires an 
explanation usually generating a paper trail, which is normally discoverable evidence.”). 
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constitutionally impermissible viewpoint criteria,353 hard evidence of such 
intent is almost impossible to find. Pragmatically, the courts recognize that 
the process of selection is inherently subjective and that they cannot prove 
what is going on in the mind of the librarian selector, so they have chosen 
to defer to librarians and trust their professional judgment in making 
acquisitions decisions.354  
In addition to these practical considerations, it is clear that those who 
would analogize between the operation of Internet software filters and the 
judgment of a librarian making book selection decisions fail to appreciate 
the significant differences between the processes of book selection and 
Internet site blocking. As the two most comprehensive federal court 
examinations of library Internet filtering to date, Mainstream Loudoun v. 
Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library355 and American Library 
Association v. United States (“ALA v. United States”)356 concluded, much 
of that difference has to do with the nature of the Internet itself. As 
described above, librarians decide whether or not to add books to a 
library’s collection on a title-by-title basis. If, for any number of reasons 
enumerated in a library’s collection development plan, a book is judged 
not to be appropriate for purchase, at least there has been a professional 
review of the title and a conscious (and hopefully objective) evaluation 
 
 
 353. Morris L. Ernst, the civil liberties lawyer who successfully defended the publishers of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses from charges of obscenity, said in 1928: 
The subterranean censorship may appear in the public library as well . . . . Do public libraries 
attempt to supervise the tastes of their readers by making it a fixed policy not to buy 
“objectionable” books? It is a simple expedient and has often been applied. The public 
librarian often has the plausible excuse that as the funds of a library are limited, he must pick 
and choose, and naturally the more “wholesome” books are to be preferred. He insists that he 
is exercising not censorship but the prerogative of free selection. Nevertheless, the character 
of this choice is often suspicious. 
MORRIS L. ERNST & WILLIAM SEAGLE, TO THE PURE . . . A STUDY OF OBSCENITY AND THE CENSOR 
101 (1928). 
 354. Nadel observes that the courts steer away from delving too deeply into librarians’ 
discretionary selection decisions, both because they realize the “substantial judicial resources” that 
they would expend in trying to establish discriminatory intent and because they understand that the 
selection process is inherently subjective. Nadel, supra note 342, at 1125. 
 355. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (1998) (opinion accompanying order denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss) [hereinafter Loudoun I]; 24 F. Supp.2d 552 (1998) (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs) 
[hereinafter Loudoun II]. Both opinions deal with the same controversy in which a group of public 
library patrons challenged a Loudoun County, Virginia, library board regulation requiring the county’s 
libraries to install “site-blocking software” on all of their computers, ostensibly to “block child 
pornography and obscene materials (hard core pornography)” and to block material “deemed harmful 
to juveniles under applicable Virginia statutes and legal precedents (soft core pornography).” Loudoun 
I, at 787 (quoting the challenged Loudoun County Library Board filtering policy). 
 356. 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge panel convened under the expedited review 
provisions of CIPA to hear library plaintiffs’ suit challenging the statute’s constitutionality) 
[hereinafter ALA v. United States]. 
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made.357 No such comprehensive review of online content is possible 
because of the enormity and uncontrolled growth of the Internet.358 When 
a library obtains Internet access, it provides its patrons with a worldwide 
collection of speech by default, much of which it would deem to be of 
“insufficient quality” to purchase if in printed form,359 but which it has no 
independent ability to control, or even review, before it arrives. Sight 
unseen, a library offering Internet access makes available a single body of 
knowledge in a “single integrated system.”360  
The differences between the traditional library collection and the 
Internet’s unique speech medium, which invites patrons to participate in “a 
vast democratic forum”361 allowing them to speak on “subjects as diverse 
as human thought,”362 could not be more stark. Library Internet access 
“indiscriminately facilitates” private speech,363 and it cannot be said that 
the library can provide any meaningful editorial discretion if it uses a 
technology that blindly blocks patron access to materials that the library 
has never even seen, let alone evaluated.364 Again, citing the unique 
characteristics of the Internet not applicable to a library’s traditional print 
collection, the Loudoun court thoroughly rejected the filtering proponents’ 
argument that selections made with filters are analogous to library 
selection decisions outside the digital environment: 
[B]y purchasing one such publication, the library has purchased 
them all. The Internet therefore more closely resembles [the] 
analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which [someone has] 
 
 
 357. Id. at 463 (describing the typical process of book selection in libraries). 
 358. The court in ALA v. United States made findings of fact concerning the estimated size of the 
Internet as of late 2001. The court found that “[a]t least 400 million people use the Internet 
worldwide,” and that “approximately 143 million Americans were using the Internet.” Id. at 416. 
Although the court found it difficult to be sure about the exact number of Web sites in existence due to 
the decentralized nature of the Internet, it cited a 2000 study that put the total number of unique Web 
sites at 7.1 million and estimated that this number would grow to approximately 11 million by 
September 2001. Id. at 419. The number of Web pages reachable by Internet search engines (referred 
to as “indexable” pages) was estimated to be 2 billion, with the indexable Web growing at 
approximately 1.5 million pages per day. The court estimated that the size of the “un-indexable” 
Internet could range from two and ten times the size of the indexable Internet. Id. With size and 
growth estimates of these proportions, any prospect of effective human review of the content and 
quality of more than a minute fraction of the Internet’s available content is, at best, a fantasy. 
 359. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (“[W]hen public libraries provide their 
patrons with Internet access, they intentionally open their doors to vast amounts of speech that clearly 
lacks [sic] sufficient quality to ever be considered for the library’s print collection.”). 
 360. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
 361. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65 (quoting Reno II, 521 U.S. at 868). 
 362. Id. at 465 (quoting Reno II, 521 U.S. at 870). 
 363. Id. at 464. 
 364. Id.  
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laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for library patrons. As 
such, the Library Board’s action is more appropriately characterized 
as a removal decision.365 
It has been pointed out that, in a world dominated by the instantaneous 
publications and accessibility of the Internet, the terms “selection” and 
“removal” have very little continuing meaning for libraries.366 Filtering 
technology fits both functions at once, or not at all, depending on one’s 
perspective. Indeed, filters could be used to help librarians find Internet 
resources that fit a particular patron’s content profile. This is the filter used 
voluntarily by a professional librarian as a tool to refine information 
access for the benefit of his or her patron. Conversely, there is the filter 
mandated by the government to block entire categories of content without 
benefit of review or evaluation. Recognizing that filters could be used to 
bring government censorship of unprecedented proportions to the Internet, 
thereby robbing it of its great value as the most democratic means of 
exchanging ideas and information ever devised, it is thoroughly 
appropriate that the constitutional distinction between library selection and 
removal continue as a means of ensuring strict scrutiny of government 
attempts to improperly limit access to protected speech online. 
B. The Forum Status of Public Libraries 
Supporters of government-mandated Internet filtering often argue that, 
even if strict scrutiny would otherwise apply to filtering decisions, a lesser 
standard of review is appropriate in libraries because they are “non-public 
forums,” requiring the courts to use an intermediate scrutiny standard to 
determine if the filtering policy “is reasonably related to an important 
governmental interest.”367 In this argument, the government concedes that 
Internet filtering is “content-based,” but it claims that strict scrutiny of 
such restrictions applies only to traditional and limited public forums and 
not to forums designed only for government speech.368 The relevant 
question is straightforward—are public libraries limited public forums or 
nonpublic forums? Arriving at the right standard for public libraries is 
complicated, however, by the unique character and tradition of the public 
 
 
 365. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94. 
 366. Peltz, supra note 349, at 474. 
 367. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (describing defendants’ argument based in part on Kreimer 
v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 368. See Part IV.B.3 (discussing the constitutional distinction between funding conditions applied 
to government speech and those applied to private speech). 
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library in the United States.  
It is a fundamental First Amendment principle that the “government 
need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and 
controls.”369 However, it is equally well settled that the government’s 
power to regulate speech, even on its own property, is not unlimited.370 
The amount of control over speech allowed to the government on its own 
property depends on the nature of the forum that the government has 
created.371 
Although the origin of the public forum doctrine can be traced back to 
at least 1939,372 the modern application of the doctrine is most frequently 
attributed to Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association,373 a 1983 opinion in which the Supreme Court identified three 
categories of forums for the purpose of analyzing the degree of protection 
afforded to speech.374 The first category is the “traditional forum,” such as 
sidewalks, streets, or public parks, which have traditionally been used for 
public assembly, communication among citizens, and discussion of public 
issues.375 The second category is the “limited or designated forum,” such 
as a school board meeting or municipal theater, which are sites on “public 
property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activity.”376 The final category consists of “nonpublic 
forums,”377 such as government office buildings,378 jails,379 federal military 
 
 
 369. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (holding that an 
airport terminal is not a public forum for First Amendment purposes). 
 370. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 371. Id. at 454 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 
(1985)). 
 372. The origin of the public forum doctrine is the subject of some scholarly dispute. Some 
attribute the term “public forum” to Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., who is said to have coined the phrase 
in his 1965 article, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. See 
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1718 (1987) (stating that the phrase “public forum” is “traditionally 
attributed” to Professor Kalven’s article). More typically, however, the concept of “public forum” is 
traced back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 
U.S. 496 (1939), which endorsed the public’s historic and constitutional right to use public streets and 
parks as places for communication. In that opinion, Justice Roberts wrote that “streets and parks . . . 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used 
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 
Id. at 515. 
 373. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 374. Id. at 44-46. 
 375. Id. at 45 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. at 515). 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 46. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (holding that the area around jails is not a 
public forum and that public demonstrations need not be allowed because they could compromise jail 
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bases,380 or teachers’ mailboxes,381 which are not, by tradition or 
government fiat, places designated as forums for expressive activity or 
speech by the public. 
The state is given wide latitude to invoke content-based regulations on 
speech in nonpublic forums if they are “reasonable” and not based on a 
speaker’s viewpoint.382 In such an environment, the government is seen as 
subsidizing its own message rather than providing funding to facilitate 
public speech.383 For the state to enforce a content-based regulation in 
traditional or limited public forums, however, mere reasonableness does 
not suffice. In such forums, the regulation must be capable of surmounting 
the strict scrutiny standard.384 Specifically, the state must be able to show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that 
it is narrowly drawn to achieve the state’s interests without unduly 
compromising fundamental constitutional rights.385 
With the Perry forum distinctions in mind, it is clear that the level of 
constitutional scrutiny that any governmental regulation of expressive 
activity and speech within a public library will face depends on a judicial 
determination of the forum category in which public libraries are placed. 
This question has been litigated in the federal courts, and these courts have 
concluded that public libraries are, in fact, limited public forums.386 In 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, the Third Circuit applied a three-part test in 
determining whether the public library constitutes a limited public 
                                                                                                                         
 
security). 
 380. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that, unlike traditional public forums, 
such as streets and parks, military bases have not been traditionally used for public speech). 
 381. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 382. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131-32, cert. denied, 
453 U.S. 917 (1981). 
 383. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)). 
 384. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 949 (1991).  
With respect to a traditional public forum, the Court has stated repeatedly that it will subject 
to strict scrutiny any governmental action that restricts speaker access to the forum on a 
content-selective basis. With respect to a designated public forum, the standard of review 
analysis is exactly the same as in the case of a traditional public forum.  
Id. at 953. 
 385. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 462 (1980). 
 386. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1258 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]n application of the 
Supreme Court’s declarations concerning this issue . . . confirm[s] that the Library constitutes a limited 
public forum, a type of designated public fora.”). Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (concluding that 
the public libraries at issue were limited public forums in light of the government’s intentions in 
establishing a county library system, their express grant of permission to the public to use the libraries, 
and the compatibility of public use in the libraries themselves). 
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forum.387 That test, which was applied in Loudoun388 and will almost 
certainly be applied in future cases in which regulation of expressive 
activity in a public library has occurred, requires that the following 
inquiries be made to determine a library’s forum status: 
a) Did the government intend to create a limited public forum when it 
authorized and established the public library system?389 
b) To what extent has the government limited or restricted access to the 
library by the public or allowed the facility to be freely used by “the 
people?”390 
c) Is the nature of the library compatible with the expressive activity 
and speech that the government’s regulation restricts?391 
As to the question of government intent in establishing the public 
library system, Kreimer and Loudoun recognize that public library systems 
are typically established by statutes and/or local resolutions that expressly 
declare that they exist to provide people with access to information and 
ideas.392 Indeed, libraries have been described as “the archetypal 
traditional government-funded loci for acquiring knowledge.”393 An 
institution that the government expressly establishes and maintains to 
serve as a public forum for the limited purposes of receiving and 
communicating information is indicative of a limited public forum as 
defined by Perry.394 
On the second question of extent of use by the public, Kreimer and 
Loudoun recognize that public libraries are typically established to serve 
the public with no restrictions on access based on age, race, religion, 
origin, background, or views.395 By opening to the public at large and 
choosing not to retain unfettered discretion governing admission, the state 
greatly limits its own discretion to restrict access and the type of 
expressive activity that the public engages in when using a public 
library.396 As to this second question, an institution which has been created 
 
 
 387. 958 F.2d 1242, 1259-62 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 388. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63. 
 389. Id. (citing Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259). 
 390. Id. at 563 (citing Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260). 
 391. Id. 
 392. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63. 
 393. Bell, supra note 330, at 221 (“If public libraries should be viewed as settings for wide-
ranging inquiry, the First Amendment should greatly restrain public libraries from blocking the 
availability of Internet sites.”). 
 394. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259. 
 395. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260. 
 396. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260. 
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for extensive use by the public is indicative of a limited public forum.397  
On the final question of the nature of the library’s compatibility with 
the type of expressive activity that a filtering policy would restrict, 
Kreimer and Loudoun found that the receipt and communication of the 
wide variety of information made expressly available to the public by 
public libraries (e.g., print and computerized resources, including the 
Internet if the library offers it) is exactly the type of expressive activity 
expected of the public by the bodies that established those libraries.398 
Receiving and communicating information made available in various 
forms is completely compatible with the type of expressive activities 
anticipated in a public library and, as such, is indicative of activity 
protected within a limited public forum.399 
The Kreimer and Loudoun conclusions that public libraries are limited 
public forums was recently adopted by the three-judge panel making the 
initial review of CIPA’s constitutionality in ALA v. United States400 and 
will be a primary point of contention during the impending Supreme Court 
consideration of the district court’s opinion.401 The more broadly the 
 
 
 397. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260. 
 398. See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256 (recognizing that public libraries are “the ‘quintessential’ 
locus for the exercise of the right to receive information and ideas”); Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563 
(“While the nature of the public library would clearly not be compatible with many forms of 
expressive activity, such as giving speeches or holding rallies . . . it is compatible with . . . the receipt 
and communication of information through the Internet. Indeed, this expressive activity is explicitly 
offered by the library.”). 
 399. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260-62; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
 400. 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002), probable jurisdiction noted 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) 
(“We are satisfied that when the government provides Internet access in a public library, it has created 
a designated public forum.”) (citing Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563). 
 401. At least two commentators have taken the position that the Kreimer, Loudoun, and ALA v. 
United States courts got it wrong when they pronounced public libraries to be limited public forums 
for all purposes. The chief proponent of this view, attorney Mark S. Nadel, suggests that the standard 
that better reflects the complexity of a “multidimensional medium” like a library is different depending 
on the activity being scrutinized. Nadel, supra note 342, at 1134-38. According to Nadel, libraries’ 
decisions concerning who should be allowed physical access to the facility fall into the limited public 
forum category and, as such, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny because they are not allowed to 
be selective in their decision-making. Id. On the other hand, when making decisions about additions to 
the library collection over which librarians are granted great deference, Nadel would classify libraries 
as nonpublic forums where the government can invoke content restrictions as long as they are 
“reasonable” and are viewpoint-neutral. Id. Bernard Bell suggests a similar approach, saying that 
“[p]ublic libraries . . . are non-public fora, at least from the speaker’s perspective . . . . Librarians 
should be free to provide the content they believe is in the best interests of their patrons without the 
constraint of considering the interests of the creators of expressive materials.” Bell, supra, note 330, at 
206. Indeed, if this theory were adopted, it would provide filtering advocates with a back-door 
approach to get Internet filters into libraries without subjecting their use to strict scrutiny. In the end, 
even if Nadel and Bell’s approach were adopted, a library would end up confronting the same nature 
of the Internet dilemmas that it now faces. Having invited the public to engage in virtually limitless 
speech by offering Internet access, the library has no tools, including filters, that can restrict patron 
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government provides access to speech in its facilities, the less deference 
the courts will give the government to control that speech;402 for example, 
government use of content-based conditional funding to encourage 
“artistic excellence” in publicly funded institutions, such as an art 
museum,403 receives reduced constitutional scrutiny because the 
government is not inviting the widest possible range of public speech. On 
the other hand, the same type of funding conditions will be subjected to 
strict scrutiny in limited public forums where the government is not the 
speaker, and where a wide variety of public speech has been invited.404 
Following this line of reasoning the district court in ALA v. United States 
found that by inviting virtually unlimited public access and financing an 
online forum in which patrons can speak on an unrestricted range of 
topics, government funding of public libraries creates a limited public 
forum in which content regulations on particular speech content are 
subject to strict scrutiny review.405  
C. CIPA Strictly Scrutinized 
Assuming that the Supreme Court does not reverse the district court 
and defer to Congress’s spending power in setting CIPA funding 
conditions, let library filtering be granted equal deference as library book 
selection decisions, or allow public libraries to be described as nonpublic 
forums, the constitutionality of CIPA will rise or fall on the government’s 
ability to convince the Court that the statute can survive First Amendment 
strict scrutiny. Neither the federal government in ALA v United States nor 
the Loudoun County Virginia Library Board in Loudoun I and Loudoun II 
were able to carry this burden at the district court level. As a result, the 
statutes challenged in those cases were ruled unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoined.406 Although the Loudoun case was never appealed, 
                                                                                                                         
 
“access” to that part of the collection without compromising patrons’ constitutional right to receive 
information. 
 402. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
 403. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (validating a statute 
requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to ensure “general standards of decency and respect for 
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public”). 
 404. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (denying 
funding to student organization publishing a college newspaper with a Christian editorial slant 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination). 
 405. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
 406. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (holding that the Federal Communications 
Commission and the Institute of Museum and Library Services “are permanently enjoined from 
withholding federal funds from any public library for failure to comply with §§ 1712(a)(2) and 
1721(b) of the Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6).”); 
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the Justice Department announced within weeks of the CIPA trial court 
decision that it had filed its notice of appeal with the Supreme Court.407  
Although the exact wording of a strict scrutiny test varies slightly from 
court to court, the general elements remain constant. To survive strict 
scrutiny, CIPA’s filtering restriction must be: (1) “necessary” and 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and (2) the least 
restrictive alternative available to serve the government’s purpose.408 An 
examination of each element and how government mandated library 
filtering fits them provides some interesting insights into the practical and 
constitutional difficulties facing government attempts to invoke such a 
program. 
1. Is a Filtering Policy Necessary to Further a Compelling State 
Interest? 
To show that a restriction on speech is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest, the required first step is to establish that the government’s 
interest is compelling. That burden lies with the government; “the 
government interest cannot be taken for granted.”409 The compelling 
interest asserted cannot be speculative, but must be based upon a real and 
demonstrated harm.410 Moreover, the government must show a connection 
between that harm and the speech it wishes to restrict.411 
Although there can be little contest that the government has a 
compelling interest in protecting children, the government has done little 
to show that unfiltered access to the Internet poses a real harm to children 
sufficient to justify compromising First Amendment rights. No one argues 
that children should not be protected from harm, but when Congress acts 
to restrict speech, much of which is protected, and in the process 
compromises perhaps the most democratic communications medium in 
history by undercutting one of society’s most First Amendment-friendly 
institutions, constitutional principles require that the government be 
compelled to prove that it is attacking an identifiable and remediable harm. 
                                                                                                                         
 
Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (holding that the Loudoun Country Library Board of Trustees is 
“permanently enjoined from enforcing its Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment”). 
 407. Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement at 1, United States v. ALA, 123 S.Ct. 551 (U.S. 2002), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/7pet/2002-0361.pet.aa.pdf (“Notice of Appeal 
. . . was filed on June 20, 2002.”). 
 408. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 565-67; ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71. 
 409. Ross, supra note 7, at 461 (citing, inter alia, Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 851). 
 410. Id. (“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech.”) (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 411. Id. at 460-61 & nn.154-55. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994). 
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Regrettably, the development of First Amendment jurisprudence 
relative to children’s speech rights does not reflect close examination by 
the courts of whether purported governmental interests are compelling. As 
evidenced in their review of major federal laws passed since the late 1980s 
restricting speech content in the name of “protecting children from 
harm,”412 the courts’ examination of the government’s compelling interests 
has been superficial, at best.413 This perfunctory review of the nature of the 
government’s interest undermines a critical component of the strict 
scrutiny test. As described by Professor Catherine J. Ross: 
First, it leads to the tacit assumption that the government’s 
proclaimed interests are virtually immune from scrutiny once the 
state invokes the protection of children. Second, it suggests that the 
boundaries of the speech from which children must be protected are 
virtually limitless . . . . Third, when courts beg the question of the 
nature of the state’s interest in regulating speech to shield the 
young, they inhibit the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence and lead emerging doctrine astray. Because courts 
have not asked the threshold questions required under First 
Amendment doctrine, they have opened the door to using children 
as an excuse for the state to intrude upon protected speech . . . .414 
In the case of CIPA, the government has asserted little more than a 
generalized interest in protecting children from harm assumed to arise 
from their viewing of pornography.415 Because reputable research on the 
 
 
 412. See Ross, supra note 7, at 430-31, for a review of the Supreme Court’s actions in Sable 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. 
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); and Reno II, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173 
(citing Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495), in which the court paid scant attention to the issue, noting, “It 
is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is 
harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards.” 
 413. Ross, supra note 7, at 431 (“[R]emarkably, in each of these three cases, the Supreme Court 
ignored its own dictates by failing to analyze the state’s asserted compelling interest. Instead, the Court 
readily accepted the asserted interest in passing.”). 
 414. Id. at 433-34. 
 415. As in the Supreme Court’s review of earlier statutes, the district court did not put the 
government to the test on this point. The court noted that “[o]n its face, CIPA is clearly intended to 
prevent public libraries’ Internet terminals from being used to disseminate to library patrons visual 
depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of minors, harmful to minors.” ALA v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 471. The court passed by the issue of actual harm resulting from 
minors’ access to “harmful” materials on the Internet with the usual incantation that the interest of 
protecting minors is “well-established” and “beyond the need for elaboration.” Id. at 471-72. It then 
went further, discussing two other potential compelling interests: the court discussed the government’s 
interest in protecting library patrons from accidental viewing of offensive materials. Id. at 472-74. It 
also discussed the state’s interest in preventing unlawful or inappropriate conduct. Id. at 474-75. 
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subject is limited, the task of proving that exposing children to unfiltered 
Internet content will cause them real harm is certainly not an easy 
proposition. As at least one court has recognized, what research has been 
done in the scientific literature is inconclusive, at best, on the correlation 
between exposure of children to sexual material and any resulting harm to 
them.416  
The issue of children’s safety while using the Internet has become the 
subject of national debate. Fueled by a near constant bombardment of 
popular press accounts warning parents of online “dangers,”417 the image 
of the Internet as a playground for sexual predators waiting to entrap 
unsuspecting children has become something of a national obsession. 
Against this backdrop, rumors become fact, and genuine concerns by 
parents and individuals trying to understand the issues and assess actual 
dangers are obscured by symbolic gestures of political opportunism and 
demagoguery.418 While the courts are not immune to political and social 
pressure, it is disturbing that they continue to allow the government’s mere 
assertion of a compelling interest to satisfy the first element of the strict 
scrutiny standard without requiring evidence of actual harm. 
Even assuming that the government could actually document and prove 
real harm to children resulting from exposure to harmful materials on 
library computers, the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny standard still 
requires proof that filtering would, in fact, alleviate this problem in a 
direct and material way.419 At this point, the technological limitations 
preventing filtering software from shielding minors from harmful material 
on the Internet while also protecting the First Amendment rights of adults 
 
 
 416. Playboy Entm’t Group v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710, 715-16 (D. Del. 1998) 
(finding that the government was unable to present any clinical evidence linking exposure of children 
to pornography and psychological harms). 
 417. Evidence exists of a correlation between press reports that concentrate on negative aspects of 
the Internet and how parents feel about the safety of their children online. In a survey of twelve major 
newspapers mentioning the Internet and children between October 15, 1997, and October 15, 1998, the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center found that two of every three stories 
relating to the Internet and the family concentrated on a narrow range of online problems (most often 
sex crimes, pornography, and privacy invasion), while one of every four such stories concentrated on 
sexual predators, child pornographers, and other types of sex crimes directly involving children. Half 
the number of stories analyzed did portray positive aspects of the Internet, but rarely were those 
comments made in the articles reporting problems. The report concludes that often poorly documented 
stories stirring parents’ alarm about their children’s safety on the web help shape the nation’s 
“conventional wisdom” on the issue. See Joseph Turow, The Annenberg Public Policy Ctr., The 
Internet and the Family: The View From Parents, The View From the Press 34-42, available at 
http://www.appcpenn.org/internet/family/rep27.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 418. See HEINS, supra note 7, at 243-53. 
 419. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). 
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are well documented.420 The most recent, and certainly the most 
comprehensive, examination of this technology’s inability to operate 
within the constraints of the First Amendment was incorporated into the 
district court’s opinion in ALA v. United States421 and was based on 
extensive findings of fact gleaned from expert testimony presented by both 
the library plaintiffs and the government.422  
The court first noted that, because of the enormous size of the Internet, 
it is very difficult to quantify the error level of filtering software.423 
Nonetheless, using testimony presented by the government’s expert 
witness, the court found that, conservatively, 6% to 15% of the sites 
blocked in public libraries analyzed in preparation for trial did not contain 
sexually explicit content, as that term is defined in CIPA.424 This finding is 
in line with the classic complaint regarding filtering products, that they are 
inflexible by their very nature and block sites with harmless content if they 
contain “keywords” such as “breast.” An example frequently given is the 
inability to access a site with instructions for performing a breast self-
examination. Despite manufacturers’ claims that refinements in the 
technology have allowed more sophisticated filtering, the court still found 
multiple examples of inexplicable blocking. A California Jewish 
Community Center site, a guide to allergies, and a flyfishing outfitter’s site 
were all blocked as “pornography,” and a Louisiana cancer treatment 
facility’s site was blocked as “sex.”425 The court observed that incidents of 
inappropriate blocking covered a wide range of subject matter, including 
 
 
 420. See generally Christopher Stern, X-Rated Files Finding Child Audience: Congressional Study 
Calls Filtering Software Ineffective, WASH. POST, July 28, 2001, at E01; Digital Chaperones for Kids, 
CONSUMER REPORTS, Mar. 2001, at 20; Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, at 28; Joe Salkowski, Web Filters Proving Ineffective But Politicians 
Effectively Milking Them, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2000, at C7; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? How Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch Free 
Speech on the Internet, published at http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html (last visited Oct. 1, 
2002); THE INTERNET FILTER ASSESSMENT PROJECT REPORT, published at http://www.bluehighways. 
com/tifap/Learn.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 421. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d. 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 422. The district court closely reviewed the testimony and research studies offered by a number of 
experts on filtering technology and actively questioned the methodologies used by both parties to 
illustrate the relative effectiveness of Internet filtering. See generally ALA v. United States, 201 F. 
Supp. 2d at 430-49 (concluding that “no presently conceivable technology can make the judgments 
necessary to determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal definitions of obscenity, child 
pornography, or harmful to minors”).  
 423. Id. at 437-42 (criticizing the government witness’s attempts to quantify the error rate of 
filtering programs). 
 424. Id. at 448. 
 425. Id. at 446-47. 
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religion, politics and government, health, careers, education, travel, and 
sports.426 
The reverse problem, that of underblocking, arises in part because of 
the size of the Internet, and particularly the portion of the Internet which is 
not indexed.427 With more than 50% of Internet content invisible to the 
tools used in filtering software to identify sites to be evaluated, the court 
recognized that perhaps as many as a billion Web pages, some 
undoubtedly containing content that would run afoul of CIPA, could slip 
through to viewers having never been filtered.428 In addition, because most 
filtering programs are designed to search for suspect text as opposed to 
graphic images,429 they cannot filter out the visual depictions that are the 
target of CIPA. While the court realized that image filtering programs 
exist, it found that the technology “is immature, ineffective, and unlikely 
to improve substantially in the near future.”430 Finally, neither automated 
nor human review techniques allow sufficient accuracy to ensure that all 
Web pages fitting CIPA’s definitions of proscribed content will in fact be 
found and properly categorized.431 
The ALA court’s ultimate finding regarding the effectiveness of 
filtering software was that “any filter that blocks enough speech to protect 
against access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, 
and harmful to minors, will necessarily overblock substantial amounts of 
speech that does not fall within these categories.”432 Because this 
technology cannot be used to comply with CIPA without preventing 
access to significant amounts of protected speech, the court held that the 
use of filters in public libraries “is not narrowly tailored to the 
government’s legitimate interest in preventing the dissemination of visual 
depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of minors, 
harmful to minors.”433  
2. Is Filtering the Least Restrictive Alternative? 
It is well established that the state bears the burden of proving that it 
has chosen the least restrictive means available to address a compelling 
 
 
 426. Id. at 446. 
 427. See supra note 358 for discussion of the term “indexable” as it pertains to the Internet. 
 428. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 431. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 436. 
 432. Id. at 476-77. 
 433. Id. at 478. 
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state interest to regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech.434 
“Without evidence that less restrictive means had ‘been tested over time,’” 
the state cannot meet its burden of proving that other arguably less 
restrictive means would not be sufficiently effective.435 There are, in fact, 
many alternatives less restrictive than filtering available and in use in 
libraries throughout the nation that greatly limit the likelihood that library 
patrons will use computers to access obscene materials.436 
Loudoun handled this issue fully, discussing a number of approaches 
that could be tested before filtering could be assumed to be the least 
restrictive alternative.437 In ALA v. United States, the court expanded on 
the list of possible options that could be as effective as filtering. 
Specifically, it suggested that any of the following less restrictive 
alternatives could serve the government’s interests and should be 
examined for effectiveness before filtering is mandated:438 Internet use 
policies; tap-on-the-shoulder policies (in which librarians visually monitor 
Internet screens and alert users when they are viewing what appears to be 
unprotected material); requiring minors to use specific computers; placing 
computers used by minors in direct view of library staff; requiring minors 
to use filtered computers when unaccompanied by parents; offering 
patrons the option of using filters; segregating filtered and unfiltered 
computers; and use of privacy screens and recessed monitors.439 Although 
both courts found that the alternatives they listed would be less restrictive 
than a comprehensive filtering policy, each declined to decide whether 
these alternatives would in fact survive constitutional scrutiny if 
implemented.440  
 
 
 434. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 435. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (quoting Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 
489, 128-29 (1989)). 
 436. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (finding that “there are plausible, less 
restrictive alternatives to the use of software filters that would serve the government’s interest in 
preventing the dissemination of obscenity and child pornography to library patrons”); See also 
Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (finding that Loudoun County’s filtering policy “is not narrowly 
tailored because less restrictive means are available to further defendant’s interests and . . . there is no 
evidence that defendant has tested any of these means over time”). 
 437. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567. Among the alternatives suggested were the installation of 
privacy screens around Internet workstations, library staff monitoring of patrons’ use of Internet 
workstations, the installation of filtering software on workstations placed in a “children only” area of 
the library, and the use of content-neutral time limits on Internet workstations. Id. 
 438. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, 
the legislature must use that alternative.”). 
 439. Id. at 480-84. 
 440. Id. at 482 n.32; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
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3. Do CIPA’s Disabling Provisions Cure Other Defects? 
Congress attempted to ameliorate the lack of narrow tailoring in CIPA 
by adding language that allows library officials to disable filters, upon 
request, for “bona fide research or other lawful purposes.”441 The ALA v. 
United States court recognized that the lack of definitional clarity of the 
phrase “bona fide research or other lawful purposes” was a cause for 
constitutional concern.442 It concluded, however, that even under the 
broadest interpretation of the phrase—allowing access to any speech that 
is constitutionally protected for that patron—the statute’s requirement that 
patrons ask the library for permission to access that speech is contrary to 
the First Amendment.443 Like Loudoun before it, which had analyzed a 
similar provision permitting citizens to publicly petition for access to 
protected speech, the ALA v. United States court recognized that such a 
requirement has “an impermissible chilling effect” on First Amendment 
rights.444 Library patrons’ reluctance to ask permission to engage in speech 
that covers a wide range of sensitive subjects, such as sexually related 
disease, sexual identity, and certain medical conditions, was likely to deter 
many from engaging in this protected speech at all. Even in cases where 
these requests could be made anonymously through the transmittal of an e-
mail request or other means that would hide the requester’s identity, the 
court noted that the accompanying delay of this procedure serves as its 
own significant burden on patrons’ unfettered exercise of their First 
Amendment rights.445 An additional concern noted in Loudoun and 
arguably applicable to ALA v. United States is that requiring individuals to 
seek permission from government agents with unfettered discretion to 
grant or deny access serves as a prior restraint to protected speech and is 
antithetical to the concepts of the First Amendment.446  
In the final analysis, the ALA v. United States court found that the 
disabling provisions do not save the statute, as at best they lessen but do 
not eliminate its First Amendment infirmities.  
 
 
 441. See discussion of disabling provisions supra at text accompanying notes 184-88. 
 442. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
 443. Id. at 485-86. 
 444. Id. at 486 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that content-based restrictions that require 
recipients to identify themselves before being granted access to disfavored speech are subject to no 
less scrutiny than outright bans on access to such speech.”). See also Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 569 
n.22 (citing Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797). Both the ALA v. United States and the Loudoun courts 
relied on Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), as the source for this principle. ALA v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70. 
 445. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88. 
 446. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress has made a transparent effort to present its latest attempt to 
restrict sexually explicit content on the Internet, the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act, as a routine use of its broad spending power. Having been 
thwarted by the courts in its efforts to tame the Internet through the use of 
direct criminal sanctions on online distribution of obscenity and material 
that is harmful to minors, Congress attempted to end-run constitutional 
roadblocks, forcing libraries to accept government regulations on speech 
content or surrender their claim to critically needed federal technology 
funds. 
When closely examined in the light of First Amendment doctrine, 
however, CIPA’s funding conditions are revealed to be the 
Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act in 
disguise—yet another congressional attempt to eradicate sexual content 
from the Internet using technology that inevitably filters out a great deal of 
constitutionally protected speech. In CIPA, Congress has demonstrated an 
even greater zeal to censor online content. It is willing not only to 
compromise the application of the First Amendment’s protections to the 
Internet, as it had tried to do with the failed CDA and COPA, but is now 
willing to achieve its goal by undercutting its own meritorious program to 
democratize Internet access by holding public libraries hostage to win its 
desired result. 
Stripped of the facade of an innocent funding decision, CIPA is one of 
the most sweeping restrictions on constitutionally protected speech ever 
invoked by Congress. Having struck down the CDA and expressed 
concern about the COPA’s eventual ability to withstand comprehensive 
strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear that it intends to 
fully protect First Amendment rights on the Internet. With CIPA having 
lost its initial round of constitutional review, the government is asking the 
Court to rescue its latest effort to “protect our children” online. While that 
goal is laudable, CIPA’s approach is fundamentally flawed. An assessment 
of the certain harm to First Amendment rights from enforcement of the 
statute’s funding conditions, as well as an analysis of the many alternative 
ways to achieve the goal at far lower cost to free speech must lead the 
Court to reject this approach and send yet another message that the 
Constitution will not allow Congress to compromise First Amendment 
principles in the online world. 
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